Phenomenal Holism BARRY DAINTON Abstract According to proponents of ‘phenomenal holism’, the intrinsic characteristics of the parts of unified conscious states are dependent to some degree on the characteristics of the wholes to which they belong. Although the doctrine can easily seem obscure or implausible, there are eminent philosophers who have defended it, amongst them Timothy Sprigge. In Stream of Consciousness (2000) I found Sprigge’s case for phenomenal holism problematic on several counts; in this paper I re-assess some of these criticisms. Recent experimental work suggests cross-modal perceptual inter- ference may be far more prevalent than expected. I argue that although these results do lend support to phenomenal holism in one of its guises, they do not support the strong form of holism espoused by Sprigge. I then move on to consider the relevance and impact of certain gestalt-related considerations, and argue that these consider- ations at best establish that the stronger form of holism applies to some parts of some experiential states, but not to all parts of all states, as Sprigge claims. I then consider a more promising way forward for anyone who wishes to defend an across-the-board holism of the strong variety, arguing that what is required is a form of phenomenal interdependence that is rooted solely in phenomenal unity. I conclude by outlining a case for thinking that an interdependence of this sort is a quite general feature of unified conscious states. 1. Phenomenal Interdependence To make matters vivid and concrete, take a look at the shaded expanse shown in Figure 1 below. After focusing your attention on this for a few moments, reflect on the character of the visual experience you are now having, and consider this question: if some small part of this experience had been different over the past few seconds, would the other parts of your visual experience also have been different as a result of this? To make matters still more vivid, we shall concern ourselves with just two small portions of your visual field: those corresponding to the A- and B-regions of E, as indicated by dotted lines in Figure 1 (we are now supposing that E represents the visual content which fills a part of your visual field). Now consider: if the B-region had been a subtly different shade, would your experience of the A-region have been different? Would A be affected in the slightest if the B-region were removed altogether? This experiment is easily 113 doi:10.1017/S135824611000007X © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2010 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67 2010