Social interaction builds the we-mode Bert Timmermans 1 , Tobias Schlicht 2 and Leonhard Schilbach 3 1 School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB24 3FX, Scotland, UK 2 Institute of Philosophy, Ruhr University Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44780 Bochum, Germany 3 Psychiatry and Psychotherapy Clinic, University Hospital of Cologne, Kerpener Str. 62, 50937 Cologne, Germany Kp urkvg qh vjg ogtkvu qh Icnnqvvk cpf HtkvjÓu yg-mode proposal of social cognition, they attempt to separate social knowing from the dynamics of social interaction in order to focus on the individual mechanisms of social cognition. We argue that this approach leads to important shortcomings: 1) it imposes an implausible dichotomy between social and non-social interaction; 2) it is circular in that it simultaneously presupposes and tries to be explanatory of social skills and does not provide a developmental story for the representational capacities underlying the we-mode; 3) it fqgu pqv tgcnn{ iq dg{qpf c pqvkqp qh Ðokttqt ogejcpkuo hqt ogpvcn uvcvguÑ cu kv remains vague about its embodied versus representational nature. The proposal is a step in the right direction in that it tries to find middle ground between adhering to an individualistic view of behavior, while at the same time taking interaction seriously. But does it take interaction seriously enough? In trying to distinguish their approach from radical interactionism, the authors reduce the influence of interaction from a quantitative to a qualitative one, in that the we-mode is described as a way of sharing mental states once we engage in interaction. Indeed, the vgto ÐoqfgÑ uwiiguvu cp qp-off switch, depending on contextual factors. A first problem with this is that the world does not consist of social as compared to non-sqekcn ukvwcvkqpu0 Fq K Òyg-oqfgÓ o{ fqiA Ï perhaps, when we both go after a ball. But do I also Òyg-oqfgÓ o{ jcouvgt, or my newborn? There is no clear account qh yjcv cevwcnn{ ocmgu c ukvwcvkqp uwkvcdng hqt c Ðyg-oqfgÑ to kick in. In other words, the we-mode lacks specificity regarding the properties of the environment upon which c ÐuykvejÑ vq vjg yg-mode crucially hinges. The second problem is the circularity of the proposal. It is not clear whether being kp c Ðyg-oqfgÑ ku c rtgtgswkukvg hqt lqkpv cevkqp q r social interaction, whether it is a consequence of it, or simply a correlate. The paper states that Ðkpfkxkfwcnu gpicigf kp joint action have a broader understanding of the behavior of their partners ]È_ by representing aspects of the interactive scene in the we-oqfg.Ñ uwiiguv ing a correlate. Further in the paper, the authors describe the we-oqfg cu Ðcigpvu ]yjq_ owuv dg cdng to co-tgrtgugpv vjg cevkqpu qh ]È_ kpvgtcevkpi rctvpgtu d{ vcmkpi kpvq ceeqwpv vjgkt rgturgevkxg.Ñ yjkej uwiiguv s that the we-mode is a prerequisite for joint action. Even hwtvjgt. ÐÈc vjgqt{ qh ujctgf cigpe{ kp vjg yg-mode explain[s] the fact that kpvgtcevkpi kpfkxkfwcnu igv vq mpqy oqtg cdqwv gcej qvjgtÈÑ uwiiguvu vjcv kv ku something that results from engaging in interaction. So, while the we-mode proposal describes how, in interaction, we come to understand other minds by engaging certain capacities in shared ways, it leaves open where these capacities actually come from, in a given interaction and over the course of development. Importantly, this is not a question of whether interaction can be enabling or constitutive; rather, it is a question of whether we can consider interaction to be ontogenetically prior to other forms of social cognition, including a we-mode. If it were simply possible for infants to switch between an I-mode and a we-mode, then it would be difficult to explain why they do not engage in scenes of joint attention before the age of nine- to twelve months, for ,Ocpwuetkrv Enkem jgtg vq fqypnqcf Ocpwuetkrv< VkEU eqoogpvaIcnnqvvkHtkvjaVkoogtocpuUejnkejvUejkndcej0fqe Enkem jgtg vq xkgy nkpmgf Tghgtgpegu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 Online commentary on Gallotti & Frith "Social cognition in the we-mode" (2013 Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17:4). http://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/abstract/S1364-6613(13)00041-7#Comments