The below paper has been published as chapter 3 in Postanalytic and Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides, eds. J. Reynolds, J. Chase, J. Williams and E. Mares, London: Continuum 2010. Chapter 3 The Fate of Transcendental Reasoning in Contemporary Philosophy James Chase and Jack Reynolds 1 1. Introduction Analytic and continental philosophers differ on the worth of transcendental reasoning. Analytic concern with transcendental reasoning was evident from the beginning of the movement, and although the analytic literature saw a brief mini- industry on the subject following Peter Strawson’s prominent use of the method, discussion of their acceptability has always been more common than their actual use, and the trend of the discussion has run against the argument form. To the extent that continental philosophy persists in the use of such modes of reasoning, then, it comes under analytic question. By contrast, in the continental traditions (from Kant to the present), it seems to us that transcendental reasoning is close to ubiquitous 2 – although what the transcendental involves has been significantly and separately reconfigured by phenomenology and the genealogical turn, as well as by a more constructivist understanding of philosophy emphasising the transformative potential of the method in concept creation. There are continental concerns about the status of transcendental reasoning, but continued creative use persists and there is no general agreement that transcendental argumentation is especially problematic. In fact, it is sometimes claimed and frequently implied