265 http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/8/3/265.editorial Editorial Neurophenomenology – A Special Issue Michael Beaton • University of the Basque Country, Spain • msjbeaton/at/gmail.com Bryony Pierce • University of Bristol, UK • bryonypierce/at/btinternet.com Susan A. J. Stuart • University of Glasgow, UK • susan.stuart/at/glasgow.ac.uk > Context • Seventeen years ago Francisco Varela introduced neurophenomenology. He proposed the integration of phenomenological approaches to irst-person experience – in the tradition of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau- Ponty – with a neuro-dynamical, scientiic approach to the study of the situated brain and body. > Problem • It is time for a re-appraisal of this ield. Has neurophenomenology already contributed to the sciences of the mind? If so, how? How should it best do so in future? Additionally, can neurophenomenology really help to resolve or dis- solve the “hard problem” of the relation between mind and body, as Varela claimed? > Method • The papers in this special issue arose out of a conference organised by the Consciousness and Experiential Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society in Bristol, UK, in September 2012. We have invited a representative sample of the speak- ers at that conference to present their work here. > Results • Various papers argue that the irst-person methods of phenomenology are distinct from, and more robust than, the failed “introspectionist” methods of early modern psychology. The “elicitation interview” emerges as a successful and widely adopted method to have emerged from this ield. Phenomenological techniques are already being successfully applied to neuroscientiic problems. Various speciic proposals for new techniques and applications are made. > Implications • It is time to take neurophenomenol- ogy seriously. It has proven its worth, and it is ripe with the potential for further immediate, successful applications. > Constructivist content • Varela’s key aim was to develop a non-dualising approach to the science of consciousness. The papers in this special issue look at the philosophical and practical details of successfully putting such an approach into practice. > Key words • Phenomenology, neuroscience, dynamical systems, first-person methods, second-person methods, the elicitation interview, introspection, consciousness. Introduction he papers collected in this special is- sue grew out of a conference on neurophe- nomenology organised by the Conscious- ness and Experiential Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society and held in Wills Hall at the University of Bristol, 15–16 September 2012. All but one of the papers herein were originally presented at that conference, and the one that was not would have been, had non-academic life not intervened. Neurophenomenology he neurophenomenological method was irst proposed by Francisco Varela in his paper Neurophenomenology: a meth- odological remedy for the hard problem (1996). In that paper Varela advocated a dual approach to consciousness studies, investigating structural parallels between Husserlian phenomenology (e.g., Husserl 1982; Merleau-Ponty 1962) and neurosci- ence, and aiming thus to reconcile irst- and third-person accounts of conscious experi- ence. However, Varela did not just aim to remedy the “hard problem,” concerning the nature of the relation between irst-person mind and third-person world (Levine 1983; Chalmers 1996). He also claimed that, by integrating the phenomenological approach to the study of irst-person experience with the neuroscientiic approach to the study of mind, both sides could make new progress, of a type inaccessible to either side work- ing alone. Unsurprisingly, this proposal has generated some interest. See, for instance, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2008) for a recent cognitive science textbook deeply informed by Varela’s research programme. Also unsurprisingly, for such a novel pro- posal, many researchers who might beneit from it are not yet aware of it, and of those who are, many remain to be convinced of its scientiic bona ides and applicability. hus, at the Bristol conference, we aimed to provide a forum in which to dis- cuss, in a constructive atmosphere, the still- pressing, basic, programmatic questions for this young, but growing, ield – fundamental questions such as: can neurophenomenol- ogy contribute to the sciences of mind? Has it already done so, and if so, how? We were also keen to stimulate further discussion as to whether neurophenomenology really does have the potential to resolve or dis- solve the hard problem, as Varela claimed, or whether hypothesising a hard problem is even a reasonable way to progress. he present selection of papers moves us forward in the discussion of these funda- mental issues in several ways. The contributions Michel Bitbol and Claire Petitmengin ar- gue that introspection (the project of gain- ing knowledge through irst-person meth- ods) has not failed and need not fail. hey accept that the speciically “introspection- ist” school of psychology did fail, and claim that this is because it linked introspection to an optional, representationalist account of the mind. Here, they outline an alterna-