Defying the resource curse: explaining successful state-owned enterprises in rentier states Journal: World Politics Manuscript ID: draft Manuscript Type: Research Article Subject Category - select one main category and any applicable subcategories: Comparative Politics, CPE < Comparative Politics, Institutional < Comparative Politics Keyword: industrial policy, Middle East, political economy of development, politics of economic growth, resource curse, state building Abstract: This paper explains how several Gulf rentier monarchies have managed to create highly profitable and well-managed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), confounding expectations of both general SOE inefficiency and of the particularly bad quality of rentier public sectors. I argue that a combination of two factors explains the outcome: the absence of a populist-mobilizational history and substantive regime autonomy in economic policy-making. We need to rethink both our generalizations about rentier states and, arguably, about public sectors in the developing world. ipcohen@princeton.edu http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/wp World Politics