Psychological Inquiry, 24: 248–271, 2013 Copyright C  Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1047-840X print / 1532-7965 online DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2013.823831 REPLY The Ape That Kicked the Hornet’s Nest: Response to Commentaries on “The Ape That Thought It Was a Peacock” Steve Stewart-Williams and Andrew G. Thomas Department of Psychology, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom We respond to the commentaries on our target article, “The Ape That Thought It Was a Peacock.” We start with specific issues raised by the article. These relate to the magnitude of human sex differences; the evolution and relative importance of pair bonding, paternal care, and polygyny in our species; and the distinction between the males-compete/females-choose (MCFC) model of human sexual psychology and the mutual mate choice (MMC) model. We then evaluate two competing theories of human sex differences and similarities: Social Role Theory and Attachment Fertility Theory. We conclude with some thoughts about how to present and teach evolutionary psychological research and theories without conveying an exaggerated impression of the scale of human sex differences. We were truly gratified by the quantity and quality of the thoughtful responses to our target article. All the commentaries raised important issues, and we enjoyed mentally jousting with them all. In the following pages, we report on some of the outcomes of this mental jousting. First, though, we briefly recap the thesis of the article in light of the commentaries. The thesis boils down to five key claims: 1. Humans are a relatively monomorphic animal. Cer- tainly, we exhibit some degree of dimorphism; it is, after all, easy to tell men apart from women (Doug Kenrick’s son, 2013, as cited in Kenrick, this issue). And certainly we are more dimorphic for some traits than for others (Kenrick, this issue; Wood & Eagly, this issue). However, humans are less like polyg- ynous peacocks or deer than we are like socially monogamous foxes and robins (Gray, this issue), or cooperatively breeding tamarins and marmosets (Snowdon, this issue). 2. Our low general dimorphism is a consequence of high levels of pair bonding and male parental care in our ancestral past. This is not to say that hu- mans are adapted solely for long-term pair bonding. Like dunnocks, 1 human sexual psychology is com- 1 Dunnocks (also known as hedge sparrows) are LBBs—Little Brown Birds—found throughout Europe and Asia. They are also common in New Zealand. patible with a range of reproductive arrangements, including monogamy, polygyny, and promiscuity (Roberts & Havl´ ıˇ cek, this issue). However, pair bonding and biparental care were important enough throughout human evolution to lead to a very gen- eral decline in psychological dimorphism. 3. Contrary to the view that humans are relative- ly monomorphic, evolutionary psychology (EP) sometimes gives the impression that there are ex- tremely large sex differences in our species. It does this in two main ways. First, there are ver- bal statements in the EP literature suggestive of large differences, but for which the research actually shows rather modest differences. Second, there is research that appears to show very large differences, but which on closer inspection probably overstates these differences (e.g., Clark & Hatfield’s [1989] “Would you go to bed with me?” study; the sexual predilections of despotic leaders; see Betzig, 1986, this issue). 4. The exaggeration of sex differences in EP is not the product of a hidden agenda or the deliberate cherry-picking of results (see Pham, Shackelford, & Jeffery, this issue). Indeed, it is probably not the product of any single cause (Buss, this issue; G. F. Miller, this issue; Pound & Price, this issue). However, one contributing factor might be EP’s historical commitment to what we call the males- compete/females choose (MCFC) model of sexual 248