ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE published: 30 April 2013 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00225 Measuring individual differences in generic beliefs in conspiracy theories across cultures: Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire Martin Bruder 1 , Peter Haffke 1 *, Nick Neave 2 , Nina Nouripanah 3 and Roland Imhoff 4 1 Department of Psychology, Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany 2 Department of Psychology, Northumbria University, Newcastle, UK 3 Department of Psychology, City University London, London, UK 4 Department of Psychology, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany Edited by: Christopher Charles French, Goldsmiths, University of London, UK Reviewed by: Jennifer L.Tackett, University of Houston, USA Karen Douglas, University of Kent, UK *Correspondence: Peter Haffke, Department of Psychology, Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, PO Box 216, 78457 Konstanz, Germany. e-mail: peter.haffke@uni-konstanz.de Conspiracy theories are ubiquitous when it comes to explaining political events and soci- etal phenomena. Individuals differ not only in the degree to which they believe in specific conspiracy theories, but also in their general susceptibility to explanations based on such theories, that is, their conspiracy mentality. We present the Conspiracy Mentality Ques- tionnaire (CMQ), an instrument designed to efficiently assess differences in the generic tendency to engage in conspiracist ideation within and across cultures.The CMQ is available in English, German, andTurkish. In four studies, we examined the CMQ’s factorial struc- ture, reliability, measurement equivalence across cultures, and its convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity. Analyses based on a cross-cultural sample (Study 1a; N = 7,766) sup- ported the conceptualization of conspiracy mentality as a one-dimensional construct across the three language versions of the CMQ that is stable across time (Study 1b; N = 141). Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated cross-cultural measurement equiv- alence of the CMQ items.The instrument could therefore be used to examine differences in conspiracy mentality between European, North American, and Middle Eastern cultures. In Studies 2–4 (total N = 476), we report (re-)analyses of three datasets demonstrating the validity of the CMQ in student and working population samples in the UK and Germany. First, attesting to its convergent validity, the CMQ was highly correlated with another measure of generic conspiracy belief. Second, the CMQ showed patterns of meaning- ful associations with personality measures (e.g., Big Five dimensions, schizotypy), other generalized political attitudes (e.g., social dominance orientation and right-wing authori- tarianism), and further individual differences (e.g., paranormal belief, lack of socio-political control). Finally, the CMQ predicted beliefs in specific conspiracy theories over and above other individual difference measures. Keywords: conspiracy theories, conspiracy mentality, generalized political attitudes, psychometric instrument, measurement equivalence, cross-cultural research “Other centuries have only dabbled in conspiracy like ama- teurs. It is our (the Twentieth) century which has established conspiracy as a system of thought and a method of action” (Moscovici, 1987, p. 153). INTRODUCTION Belief in conspiracy theories continues to thrive in the twenty-first century. In Western cultures, recent popular conspiracy theories have revolved – among other themes – around the perpetrators (and possible knowing bystanders) of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York (Stempel et al., 2007; Swami et al., 2010), the deaths of Princess Diana (Douglas and Sutton, 2008), and Osama bin Laden (Wood et al., 2012), and the scien- tific evidence for climate change (Leiserowitz, 2006). These new conspiracy theories take their place next to“classics”such as alleged plots concerning the assassination of John F. Kennedy (McHoskey, 1995), the cover-up of alien contact (Harrison and Thomas, 1997), or the origins of diseases such as HIV (Ross et al., 2006). There is increasing evidence that there are stable individual differences in people’s tendency to believe in such conspiracy the- ories; if a person believes in one conspiracy theory, he or she will also be more likely to believe in other conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2010). In fact, this tendency even extends to beliefs in mutually contradictory conspiracy theories, and to beliefs in fully fictitious conspiracy theories. Thus, those who believe that Princess Diana faked her own death are also more likely to believe that she was murdered (Wood et al., 2012); those who believe in “real-world conspiracy theories” (i.e., that John F. Kennedy fell victim to an organized conspiracy) are more likely to believe that there was a conspiracy behind the success of the Red Bull energy drink – a conspiracy theory that was purposely developed for a social psychology study (Swami et al., 2011). www.frontiersin.org April 2013 |Volume 4 | Article 225 | 1