CONCRETENESS OF ABSTRACT CONCEPTS: OBJECTIFICA- TION AS AN EMERGENT FEATURE OF METAPHOR ANNA JELEC Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań ajelec@ifa.amu.edu.pl ABSTRACT This paper proposes an adjustment in metaphor typology within Contemporary Theory of Metaphor (Lakoff 1993) to accommodate insight drawn from the theory of objectification (Szwedek 2002, 2007, 2011) and embodied experience. It is the aim of this paper to investi- gate the abstract/ concrete distinction in a manner that will provide insight with regard to the role of tangibility in human cognition and identify one possible consequence of embodied experiential grounding. Keywords: objectification, conceptual metaphor, feature emergence, embodiment, grounding 1. Introduction The original work on conceptual metaphor by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) evolved into what is known as the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor or CTM (Lakoff 1993) in the course of a decade. From the beginning these theories faced a number of criti- cal comments. Some of these issues, such as the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts (Szwedek 2002, 2011), the role of embodiment (Vervaeke and Kennedy 2004), or the structure and typology of metaphor are yet to be adequately addressed. It is clear that there is much development to be expected in the field of CTM (Ruiz de Mendoza and Hernandez 2011: 161). In view of the growing ten- dency toward interdisciplinary research CTM would benefit from a focus on the ex- periential basis of metaphor that results in a streamlined metaphor typology both conducive to empirical research and attractive to researchers from a variety of scien- tific fields. While Lakoff and Johnson state that “conceptual metaphors reflect the structure of thought” a number of commentators noted that this claim is effectively unfalsifi- able, that is, in its current form it cannot be empirically proven incorrect (cf. Ver- vaeke and Kennedy 1996). Consider an expression identified as incoherent with a