1 Published in Economics Letters 96(2), August 2007, 177-182. Does Opportunism Pay Off? by Linda G. Veiga * and Francisco José Veiga Universidade do Minho and NIPE Abstract: In Portugal, increases in investment expenditures and changes in the composition of spending favouring highly visible items are associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors seeking re-election. The political payoff to opportunistic spending increased after democracy became well-established in the country. Keywords: Voting functions, opportunism, local governments, elections, Portugal. JEL codes: D72, H72 1. Introduction The objective of this article is to determine whether opportunistic mayors can increase their chances of re-election 1 by generating political budgetary cycles around elections. We test the hypothesis that pre-electoral increases in municipal expenditures and changes in their composition, favouring items most visible to or preferred by the electorate, are associated with higher vote percentages for the incumbent mayor. * Corresponding author: Linda G. Veiga, Escola de Economia e Gestão, Universidade do Minho, 4710- 057 Braga, Portugal. Tel.: +351-253604564; Fax: +351-253676375; Email: linda@eeg.uminho.pt. 1 For a literature review on vote and popularity functions see Paldam (2004).