Philosophy Compass 8/6 (2013): 560–569, 10.1111/phc3.12044 Bayle on the (Ir)rationality of Religious Belief Kristen Irwin * Biola University Abstract Bayle’s conception of reason is notoriously difficult to unravel, as are its consequences for the rational- ity of religious belief. The secondary literature has generally coalesced around two interpretations of Bayle’s conception of reason. The “superskeptical” interpretation holds that reason is the source of its own undoing, not to be trusted; religious belief turns out to be irrational on this conception of rea- son, but this is hardly cause for alarm. The jusqu’au bout (to the very end) interpretation holds that rea- son is to be followed wherever it leads, and if one follows closely, reason requires the rejection of religious belief. On both models, religious belief turns out to be irrational. In this piece, I summarize and examine these two interpretations, and using José Maia Neto’s exposition of Bayle as an Academic skeptic, I propose a third that I call “common sense” skepticism. On this reading, reason does indeed use logic to form and sort beliefs – including some religious beliefs – but only holds to those beliefs fallibilistically. There may be a category of religious beliefs, however, that can only be recommended by faith; these would be religious beliefs that lack rational evidence, or exhibit rational contradictions. On this view, while some religious beliefs may turn out to be rational, there will likely be a set of core religious beliefs that come out to be irrational. I end by highlighting a suggestion by Bayle that reason itself may recommend revelation as a guide to belief, conferring a kind of intermediate rationality even on apparently irrational religious beliefs. 1. Introduction Bayle’s conception of reason is notoriously difficult to unravel, as are its consequences for the rationality of religious belief. The secondary literature has generally coalesced around two interpretations of Bayle’s conception of reason. According to interpreters such as Richard Popkin, Bayle’s conception of reason is radically skeptical; in fact, Popkin coins the term “supersceptic” to describe Bayle’s Pyrrhonian view of reason. Bayle sees reason as the source of its own destruction, necessarily unraveling that which it creates. On this reading of Bayle’s conception of reason, religious belief is a casualty of reason’s self-destruction, though Bayle suggests faith as a replace- ment guide to reason. On this view, the only possible support for religious belief is revelation affirmed by faith. According to interpreters such as Gianluca Mori, Bayle’s skepticism is simply a commitment to allow reason to go jusqu’au bout – to follow logic fearlessly wherever it may lead. On this reading of Bayle’s conception of reason as well, religious belief – Christian religious belief speci fically – turns out to be irrational, since it contradicts basic principles of logic (in light of such doctrines as the Trinity and the Incarnation) and morality (in light of the problem of evil). On this view, the only rationally consistent religious position for Bayle to hold is atheism. My goals in this piece are twofold. First, I summarize and categorize the two primary interpre- tations of Bayle’s conception of reason and the consequences for the rationality of religious belief, showing that on both models, religious belief comes out as irrational. Second, I examine several underappreciated texts pertaining to Bayle’s conception of reason, and suggest a third conception that I call common sense Academic skepticism. On this reading, reason does indeed use logic to © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd