Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox by MASSIMILIANO CARRARA Department of Philosophy, University of Padua and DAVIDE FASSIO Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva Abstract: The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument to the effect that, if there are truths not actually known, then there are unknowable truths. Recently,Alexander Paseau and Bernard Linsky have independently suggested a possible way to counter this argument by typing knowledge. In this article, we argue against their proposal that if one abstracts from other possible independent considerations supporting reasons for typing knowledge and considers the motivation for a type- theoretic approach with respect to the Knowability Paradox alone, there is no substantive philo- sophical motivation to type knowledge, except that of solving the paradox. Every attempt to independently justify the typing of knowledge is doomed to failure. Keywords: Knowability Paradox, type theory, epistemic paradoxes 1. Introduction A LOGICAL ARGUMENT known as the Knowability Paradox starts from the assump- tion that every truth is knowable and leads to the consequence that every truth is also actually known. Given the ordinary fact that some true propositions are not actually known, the argument then concludes, by modus tollens, that there are unknowable truths. The straightforward conclusion of the argument seems to be seriously problem- atic for those assuming that every truth is, at least in principle, knowable. For instance, it is problematic for some semantic anti-realist theories that require an epistemic characterization of the notion of truth and certain “optimistic” views in epistemology and philosophy of science, according to which no truths exceed our cognitive capacities to grasp them. 1 Many strategies have been suggested in order to avoid the paradoxical conclu- sion. 2 Recently, Alexander Paseau (2008) and Bernard Linsky (2009) have inde- 1 An example of this view is the so-called “Gödelian Optimism”. 2 For an introduction and a general overview of the various critical approaches to the paradox, see Brogaard and Salerno (2009) and Kvanvig (2006). THEORIA, 2011, 77, 180–193 doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01100.x © 2011 Stiftelsen Theoria. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.