L&PS – Logic and Philosophy of Science Vol. IX, No. 1, 2011, pp. pp. 199-206 Curry’s Paradox. A new Argument for Trivialism Massimiliano Carrara Department of Philosophy University of Padua (Italy) e-mail: massimiliano.carrara@unipd.it Enrico Martino Department of Philosophy University of Padua (Italy) e-mail: enrico.martino@unipd.it © The Author 2011. Published by L&PS – Logic and Philosophy of Science http://www2.units.it/ ~episteme — ISSN: 1826-1043 1. Introduction 2. Curry’s paradox and its arithmetical formalization 3. On the general validity of MPP 4. A new argument for trivialism 5. Conclusion ABSTRACT. In dialetheism some sentences, called dialetheias, are both true and false. A crucial problem of this logical theory is that of avoiding trivialism, i.e. the consequence that all sentences are diale- theias. Priest tries to avoid trivialism by rejecting some principles of classical logic. In the present paper we formulate a new version of Curry's paradox and argue that trivialism follows even from logical principles that are dialetheistically correct. To the purpose we will use a notion of naïve deducibility, defended by Priest in his discus- sion of Gödel’s theorem. 1. Introduction As is well known, dialetheism maintains the thesis that there are true contra- dictions, i.e. true sentences of form (A∧¬A), called dialetheias. More gener- ally, we will call “dialetheia” any sentence that is both true and false. In a re- ach series of papers and books (see, for example, Priest 1979, 2001, 2002,