CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 55, 24 October 2013 8 Different Meanings of the October 2013 Presidential Elections in Azerbaijan: Elites, Opposition, and Citizens By Farid Guliyev, Bremen and Baku Abstract is article oers a contextual analysis of the Azerbaijani October 2013 presidential elections making a number of arguments: (1) during good times (when economic and political shocks are absent), elections are unlikely to induce incumbent defeat or democratic breakthrough; this explains why the October elections were business as usual; (2) the October elections had dierent roles and meanings for dierent actors: win- ning with a fabricated landslide was used by the leader to signal his own and his regime’s strength and to intimidate opponents; for the opposition, it was an arena to mobilize support and to expose government cor- ruption; for citizens, elections were less relevant as something aecting their everyday lives; (3) many citi- zens hold an instrumental and clientelistic view of government as a system to deliver particularistic services which matches well with the clientelism at higher political levels and might complicate collective action and impede the prospects of the country’s democratization in the future. Certainty of the Election Results Most modern authoritarian regimes hold regular elec- tions that allow opposition candidates to compete for government oces. Yet, as the playing eld is skewed towards the ruling party, opponents have no real chance to win. Under such conditions, elections sometimes can increase the prospects of liberalization or even democ- ratization of authoritarian regimes. However, in the absence of economic or political crises, which would result in division among ruling elites and loss of support for the regime, elections are not likely to induce incum- bent defeat. Instead, they will likely serve to shore up the survival prospects of the existing regime. Contestation during the October 9 elections in Azerbaijan was not fair as existing political and eco- nomic conditions favoured the incumbent’s victory. Ilham Aliyev, now 51, has served as president for ten years since he succeeded his father Heydar in 2003. e unprecedented oil boom allowed Aliyev’s govern- ment to accumulate great wealth in the state and spend it (the assets of the state oil fund, the nation’s sav- ings fund, reached US$34 billion this year). A large amount of public funds has already been spent in a rel- atively short period of time and mainly on infrastruc- ture projects. Under conditions of weak government oversight and an ‘opaque’ procurement system, there is plenty of room for diverting these funds into o- cials’ pockets. is increase in state spending ensured the loyalty of elites. anks to the pre-emptive measures taken in 2009 to scrap presidential term limits, which had been set at two terms, the president could now run for a third (and more) term. Alleged coups in 2005 notwithstand- ing, Aliyev’s political power has not been seriously challenged by contenders from within the elite. ere are no immediate expectations that he will step down. As economic and political crises were notably absent during this year’s election cycle, conditions were sim- ply not ripe for any government turnover, let alone regime transition. Even before the voting began, it was known who was going to win. In an election deemed deeply awed by international observers, President Aliyev secured a third term in oce. e incumbent was so condent in his victory that he did not run an election campaign (except for the fact that state-run TV channels were running it for him), did not appear in televised debates and even had his inauguration prepared before ocial results were announced. Such certainty contrasts sharply with election contests in democratic countries, which are characterized by high levels of ex-ante uncertainty as to who will be the winner. Even though the election outcomes were pre-deter- mined, the elections were not unimportant or meaning- less. In this essay, I show that the October elections had dierent meanings and played dierent roles for three distinct sets of relevant actors: the regime, the opposi- tion, and the population. First, for the regime actors— the incumbent president and ruling elites—the election was an act of projecting strength and intimidating poten- tial opponents. Second, for the old opposition parties it was a chance to contest the hegemony of the current leadership and its legitimacy, and for the new entrant political movement REAL, it was a learning experience and an opportunity to prepare for future elections. ird, for the citizens, who have largely clientelistic-particu- laristic expectations and an instrumental view of gov- ernment, voting was less relevant as many believe that elections were not going to bring about changes aect- ing their lives.