SARAH SORIAL CAN SAYING SOMETHING MAKE IT SO? THE NATURE OF SEDITIOUS HARM (Accepted 9 September 2009) ABSTRACT. In this paper, I redress an analytic deficit in debates about sedition by providing an explanatorily account of the relation between speech and action using speech act theory as developed by J.L. Austin. The specific focus will be on speech acts advocating violence against the state, in the form of religious sermons preaching violent jihad or glorifying acts of terrorism. This philosophical account will have legal consequences for how we classify speech acts deemed to be dangerous, or to cause harm. It also suggests that because speech can constitute action or conduct in certain circumstances, sedition laws, in principle, might be defensible, but not in their current form. Sedition is essentially a crime against the security of the state. It refers to the uttering or writing of words intended to bring the sovereign state into hatred or contempt, to urge disaffection against the Constitution or democratically elected government, or the attempt to procure change in government by unlawful means. Sedition has traditionally been justified on the grounds that a sovereign government has the right to resist both external and internal aggression, and to protect the citizens of the state from harm. More recently, the law of sedition has been ÔmodernisedÕ for the counter terrorism context. Modern sedi- tion laws target types of speech advocating violence against the state, in the form of religious sermons preaching violent jihad or glorifying acts of terrorism, although they have the potential to cover much more than this. For this reason, the modernisation of sedition laws renewed debate about the status of free speech and religious expression in a time of so-called terror. Law and Philosophy (2010) 29:273–305 Ó Springer 2009 DOI 10.1007/s10982-009-9063-0