1 Nozick’s Real Argument for the Minimal State  Keith Hyams Published in the Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (2004): 353-364 ABSTRACT Nozick is often interpreted as arguing that independents are entitled to protection by the Dominant Protective Agency (DPA) because the DPA infringes their right to punish those who violate their rights. Yet a closer look at Anarchy, State and Utopia reveals that Nozick actually rejects the very argument which is commonly attributed to him, and that he does so for good reason. However, I argue that Nozick’s replacement principle of compensation for disadvantage, meant to ground his real argument for independents’ entitlement to protection by the DPA, ought to be unacceptable to a libertarian. I end by suggesting an alternative to it which remains faithful to basic libertarian principles. THE MINIMAL STATE To qualify as a state, Nozick claims, an association must as a minimum condition have ‘the requisite sort of monopoly over the use of force in the territory’ and it must protect ‘the rights of everyone in the territory, even if this universal protection could be provided only in a “redistributive” fashion’. 1 In part one of Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick sets himself the formidable task of demonstrating that such a state could arise, with no morally impermissible steps, from a Hobbesian style ‘state of nature’. What makes his task difficult is that for Nozick,  I would like to thank two referees for The Journal of Political Philosophy for their comments on an earlier version of this article. 1 Nozick 1974, p. 113; see also pp. 26-27