1 Plotinus and Plato on Soul and Action 1 Eyjólfur K. Emilsson In the treatise “τn free will and the will of the τne” (VIέκέ[3λ]) chapter θ, Plotinus says in connection with human self-determination: so that also in practical actions self-determination and being in our power is not referred to practice and outward activity but to the inner activity of virtue itself, that is, its thought and contemplation. 2 In this paper I wish to comment on this remark. It seems to me that despite its brevity this passage is indeed quite revealing about more than one aspect of Plotinus’ thoughtέ όirstly, it shows something about the application of Plotinus’ so-called doctrine of double activity, which distinguishes between an inner and an outer activity. This doctrine has mostly been associated with metaphysical activities such as the generation of Intellect from the One. We see here, however, that it is also applied in the context of the soul, virtue, and action. This is in itself quite interesting and I shall come back to its significance later on. Secondly, it seems to me that our short passage shows us something remarkable about how Plotinus reads and uses Plato, in this case in particular how he reads Republic IV, 443c-d. As we shall see, he takes a Platonic remark that has to do with the relationship between the soul, virtue, and action, and puts it into a new context, probably fairly remote from Plato’s original concernsέ σevertheless, there may well lie a plausible understanding of Plato behind Plotinus’ application of the Platonic phrase.