Hysteria, Race, and Phlogiston. A M odel ofOntological Elimination in theHuman Sciences David Ludwig Final Version forthcomingin Studiesin theHistoryand Philosophyof SciencePartC, Studiesin History and Philosophyof Biological and Biomedical Sciences Abstract: Eliminationcontroversies are ubiquitous inphilosophy andthe humansciences. For example, it has beensuggestedthat human races, hysteria, intelligence, mental disorder, propositional attitudessuchasbeliefs anddesires, theself, andthesuper-egoshouldbe eliminatedfrom thelist of respectableentities inthehumansciences. Iarguethat eliminativist proposals areoftenpresentedinthe frameworkof anoversimplified‘‘phlogistonmodel’’ andsuggest analternative account that describes ontological eliminationona gradual scale between criticismof empirical assumptions and conceptual choices. Scientificontologiesareconstantly changing through theintroduction ofnew entitiesand theelimination of old entities that have become obsolete. Sometimes the elimination of an entity is an uncontroversial consequenceofnew empirical evidence. Forexample, new observational datamaylead an astrophysicistto the elimination ofa planetora geographerto the elimination ofan island thathad previously been assumed to exist. Despitetheavailability ofuncontroversialexamples, notallissuesin scientificontologiescan besettled easily.Even ifwe limitourselves to the human sciences,examples ofcontroversialelimination issues are legion.Forexample,philosophershave disagreed regarding the ontologicalstatusofpropositionalattitudes such asbeliefsand desires(Churchland & Churchland,1998)aswellasmore generalpsychologicalentities such astheself(M etzinger, 2004). Unsettled elimination controversiesarenotonlyfound with regard to folk- psychological entitiesbutalso entitiesthathaveastrong tradition in experimental psychology such asgeneral intelligence (Gardner,1985;Schlinger,2003) or basic emotions (Cohen,2013;Ortony & Turner,1990). Furthermore,psychiatric debates have been concerned with the elimination ofmentaldisorders in general (Szasz, 2011)aswell asmorespecificpsychiatricentitiessuch ashysteria(M icale, 1993)ormultiplepersonality disorder(Hacking,1996).Finally,elimination debatesalso occurin human biology ascurrentcontroversies abouttheexistenceofhuman races(Glasgow, 2008)illustrate. The ubiquity ofelimination controversiesin the human sciences raisesthe generalbutrarely discussed (an exception isChang,2011)question atwhatpointscientistsshould eliminate an entity from their ontology. Typically,elimination controversies focus on one specific entity and consider other cases of ontological elimination only briefly through analogiesto obsolete entitiesin the history ofsciencesuch asthe élan vital, ether, phlogiston, phrenological organs, oreven witchcraft. In thisarticle, Iwantto arguethatthissituation is unfortunate as it often leads to the implicit use of an oversimplified ‘‘phlogiston model’’of ontological elimination (Section 1) that proves inadequate for many debates in the human sciences (Section 2). Furthermore, Iwill proposeamorecomplex model thatinterpretsontological elimination astypically located on gradualscalebetween criticism ofempiricalassumptionsand conceptualchoices(Section 3). Finally, Itry to show thatthisgradual model ishelpful in thehistoryand philosophyofsciencebydiscussingitsapplication to debatesabouttheexistenceofhuman races(Section 4). 1. Thephlogiston model ofontological elimination In criticizingontological assumptions, philosophersand scientistsoften comparetheirtargetsto failed entities in thehistoryofscience. Forwhateverreason, analogieswith phlogiston areespeciallypopularasaquick look attheliteratureillustrates. Someofthebestknown phlogiston analogiescomefrom debatesin philosophy of 1