Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LxxlI, No. 3, May 2006 Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony SANFORD GOLDBERG University of Kentucky DAVID HENDERSON The University of Memphis One of the central points of contention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the uniqueness (or not) of the justification of beliefs formed through testimony-whether such justification can be accounted for in terms of, or ‘reduced to,’ other familiar sort of justification, e.g. without relying on any epistemic principles unique to testimony. One influential argument for the reductionist position, found in the work of Elizabeth Fricker, argues by appeal to the need for the hearer to monitor the testimony for credibility. Fricker (1994) argues, first, that some monitoring for trustworthiness is required if the hearer is to avoid being gullible, and second, that reductionism but not anti-reductionism is compatible with ascribing an important role to the process of monitoring in the course of justifiably accepting observed testimony. In this paper we argue that such an argu- ment fails. 1. Fricker’s argument from gullibility Polyanna is notoriously naive. She is optimistic in the face of cogent evi- dence that things are not going well. She maintains her faith in the goodness of humanity in spite of numerous examples of human perfidy and malice. She has no imagination when it comes to the vicious motives that often inspire people’s behavior. Here we focus on another epistemic shortcoming: her gullibility. Polyanna is easily deceived insofar as she is ready to accept what she is told, merely in virtue of being so told. This is not admirable. The effects of her gullibility are both practical-she is easily manipulated by others-and epistemic-she comes to believe many things which could easily be the results of epistemically undesirable processes in others, and which she would not believe but for the testimony. An adequate epistemology of testi- mony must see Polyanna as unjustified in the way that she acquires beliefs through testimony. Elizabeth Fricker has presented an argument that anti-reductionist accounts of the epistemology of testimony (AR) would fail this adequacy requirement. 600 SANFORD GOLDBERG AND DAVID HENDERSON