1 ‐This is a pre‐print version; please refer to the final published version if quoting. ‐Published in J. PADILLA GÁLVEZ, M. GAFFAL (eds.), 2012, Doubtful Certainties. Language‐Games, Forms of Life, Relativism (Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag) pp. 63‐74. ANIMAL LOGIC AND TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS: ON CERTAINTY'S TWO LEVELS OF JUSTIFICATION Modesto M. Gómez Alonso Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca modestomga@hotmail.com Abstract. The aims of this paper are: (i) to reject deflationary and naturalistic readings of On Certainty; (ii) to show how, according to Wittgenstein, perceptual basic beliefs are grounded in epistemic competences which are not reason‐involving; (iii) to distinguish two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, in order to explain why Wittgenstein makes use of transcendental arguments. 1. Deflationary and naturalistic interpretations of On Certainty. Certain conundra mark the heart of our incomprehension in a particularly vivid way, they are the most painful symptoms of our affliction. Skepticism is one of these problems, or, borrowing from Davidson, it is "our grudging tribute" (Davidson 2001, 206) to the apparent impossibility of coming to terms with three irreducible (and at first sight, independent) varieties of knowledge: the subjective, the intersubjective, and the objective. Among interpreters of On Certainty there is consensus regarding two points: Wittgenstein's last collection of notes is not a skeptical handbook; his author is fighting to articulate an epistemological position capable to put an end to skeptical qualms in the realm of philosophy, a position whose significance is overwhelming. Unfortunately, beyond these general remarks disagreement is the rule. It is enough a cursory examination of literature to verify that almost every significant contribution to debates in analytic epistemology written in the last four decades has been disinterred from this enigmatic work in progress, and hence that interpreters attribute incompatible views to Wittgenstein. Two of these readings, the deflationary and the naturalistic interpretations, have come to be the focus of controversy. According to the deflationary reading, forcefully advocated by Michael Williams (Williams 2004, 76‐96), Wittgenstein's view of skepticism is close to Carnap's: skepticism is not idle, but nonsensical; it is absurd to raise the question if our basic beliefs, namely, those which cannot be either refuted or verified, and which Danièle Moyal‐Sharrock dubbed hinge beliefs (Moyal‐ Sharrock 2007, 8), are in agreement with the world; skeptics and epistemologists are guilty of the category mistake of conflating rules and propositions, ascribing a cognitive and factual content exclusive of the latter to the former. According to this type of outlook, Wittgenstein's stance could be labeled as "internalism": the rules of the language‐game (which include stand fast