Refusing Ontological Colonization Margaret Stout West Virginia University This reflective essay was inspired by a conversation during the Open Spaces process convened by Tom Catlaw and Kelly Campbell Rawlings at the 2009 conference of the Public Administration Theory Network. The conversation’s theme was drawn from Waldo’s (1980, 1984) notion of “democracy as a way of life,” in which he challenged the public administration maxim that autoc- racy during work hours is the price we pay for democracy after hours. But more broadly interpreted than these management concerns is his notion of democracy as an ethos that should permeate all aspects of life (Marini, 1993). As such, the conversation centered on the problem of defining democracy as a way of relating that is exemplified in practices, attitudes, and values that can imbue any dimension of life. How do we describe this way of relating? How does it accommodate the exercise of authority? How do we see it manifest in government, workplaces, markets, neighborhoods, schools, and families? Through these questions, we explored the ideas that buttress egalitarian, interdependent relationships. Why would we choose to relate in such a way? In the political arena, this is often explained with an Aristotelian ideal of ac- tive participation in the political as an end in and of itself beyond the right of citizenship. Digging deeper, we find the Deweyan notion of a normative mode of social organization for collective problem solving that extends beyond gov- ernment to workplaces, neighborhoods, and families (Talisse, 2003). In other words, democracy as a way of life calls for a particular quality of relating in all social activities, whether they are political, economic, or civic in nature. Such a quality of relating is guided by rules, norms, or agreements that can be described as governance. Thus, we are talking about how authority works in a democratic fashion in any context. Such a claim prompts the question: Why should we seek to govern all social interaction democratically? Why can we not have democracy in the polis, autocracy in the workplace or home, and meritocracy in the market? Why can we not seek to keep separate these spheres of activity so that each may privilege its own forms of authority, rationality, and ways of relating? Certainly, we have heard calls for such reinvigoration of sectoral differences and boundaries from theorists like Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Alberto Guerreiro Ramos. One contrary answer hinges on empirical observation—our sectors of social 600 Administrative Theory & Praxis / December 2010, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 600–605. © 2010 Public Administration Theory Network. 1084-1806 / 2010 $9.50 + 0.00. DOI 10.2753/ATP1084-1806320407