Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1991 177 Who are the Mentally Handicapped? PAULA BODDINGTON & TESSA PODPADEC ABSTRACT In this paper we compare philosophical and contemporary psychological approaches to mental handicap. Careful comparison between the disciplines reveals major differences and indicates that much further work is needed which would be B i t f u l for both sides. The two disciplines concentrate on diyerent questions:philosophy tends to look chiefZy at mental handicap in relation to issues ofpersonhood and is not very clear about what mental handicap is; psychology on the other hand is much more specific about mental handicap, but shows little concern with critically examining value issues. Our main intention is to explore the different ways in which mental handicap is defined and seen as a class. We conclude that class definition embodies a significant normative component and a large element of social construction. To ignore this and attempt to make normative judgements on the basis of class membership is thus high& problematic. Since within philosophy, these normative issues are often discussed in terms of personhood, this category is also critically examined and the conclusion is reached that it too has normative and social components which can lead to ethically dubious judgements being made about ’the mentally handicapped’. 1 Why are we Writing the Paper? In this paper we compare philosophical and contemporary psychological approaches to mental handicap. Careful comparison between the disciplines reveals major differences and indicates that much further work is needed, which would be fruitful for both sides. The two disciplines concentrate on different questions: philosophy tends to look chiefly at mental handicap in relation to issues of personhood and is not very clear about what mental handicap is; psychology, on the other hand, is much more specific about mental handicap, but shows little concern with critically examining value issues. Our main intention is to explore the way in which mental handicap is defined and seen as a class. Since the way in which this supposed group is defined often leads to questions being raised about the relationship of this group to the class of persons, issues of personhood are also critically discussed. This study stemmed originally from concern about the way in which philosophy often uses mental handicap as a case of marginal personhood. The question often arises as to whether members of this group qualify as persons. It arises, for example, in de Roose’s discussion of Lomasky [l], who argues that the mentally handicapped should be included in the moral field of rights holders. However, Lomasky’s account of rights as possessed by project pursuers leads him to view ‘defective’ human beings as a class of marginal cases which need a special argument of their own before they are seen as rights holders along with others [2]. The conclusion of this type of work may be that at least some mentally handicapped people lack, while others possess to a limited degree,