Informal Logic and the Dialectical Approach to Argument DOUGLAS WALTON 1 and DAVID M. GODDEN 2 1 Department of Philosophy The University of Winnipeg Winnipeg, Manitoba Canada R3B 2E9 d.walton@uwinnipeg.ca 2 Department of Philosophy The University of Windsor Windsor, Ontario Canada N9B 3P4 goddendm@uwindsor.ca Walton, D. and Godden, D. (2007.) Informal logic and the dialectical approach to argument. In H.V. Hansen and R.C. Pinto (Eds.), Reason Reclaimed (pp. 3-17). Newport News, VA: Vale Press. INTRODUCTION Undoubtedly, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair are two of the patriarchs of informal logic (IL), and they remain its most recognized exponents. The informal logic movement initially began as a rejection of the tools of formal logic as an effective means of analysing and evaluating everyday reasoning and argumentation. As it developed, IL began to adopt a dialectical conception of its subject matter, and started to utilize the theoretical and methodological tools associated with this approach. This paper explores the influence of the dialectical conception of argument on the development of informal logic. Noting that neither Blair nor Johnson has embraced a dialogic approach to the dialectical, we situate Walton’s dialog-based approach in relation to that of informal logic. INFORMAL LOGIC: ORIGINAL CONCEPTIONS In reflecting on the origins of informal logic, Johnson and Blair (2002, pp. 340-352; cf. 1980, p. 5) describe it as arising in the context of three streams of criticism to the existing academic logic program. First the pedagogical critique challenged that the tools of logic should be applicable to everyday reasoning and argument of the sorts used in political, social and practical issues. Second the internal critique challenged the adequacy of existing tools of logic in evaluating everyday argument. Specifically rejected was the logical idea of soundness as either a necessary or a sufficient criterion for the goodness of arguments, 1 as well as a formalistic understanding of validity. Finally, the empirical critique challenged the ideas that formal deductive logic can provide a theory of good reasoning, and that the ability to reason well is improved by a knowledge of formal deduction. As well, Johnson and Blair (2002, p. 355) associate the genesis of informal logic with a renewed interest in the informal fallacies which were also inadequately treated in traditional logic programs of the time. 1 cf. Johnson (1995, p. 235) where this rejection is taken as definitive of the informal logic approach.