Appeared in The Journal of Mind and Behavior 43(2):177-195. Please quote from the printed version Problematizing Tye’s Intentionalism: The Content of Bodily Sensations, Emotions, and Moods Juan J. Colomina The University of Texas at Austin Author Note Juan J. Colomina, Department of Philosophy and the Center for Mexican American Studies The University of Texas at Austin I am deeply indebted to the 1 st Workshop on Language and Emotions audience, held in Granada, especially to Fernando M. Manrique and Jesse Prinz, and the 2012 Meeting of the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology audience for their detailed comments. I would like to acknowledge the conversations with Juan José Acero, Nicole M. Guidotti-Hernández, Manuel Liz, David Pérez Chico, Vicente Raga, Michael Tye, and Margarita Vázquez, and the comments from an anonymous reviewer, that have improved previous drafts of this article. Special thanks to Ray Russ for his help and work with the final version. The research was partially supported by the Spanish government-funded projects (Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad) FFI2008- 01205: “Points of View: A Philosophical Investigation” and FII2011-24549: “Points of View and Temporal Structures.” Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Juan J. Colomina, Department of Philosophy and the Center for Mexican American Studies, The University of Texas at Austin, 2505 University Avenue, Stop F9200, Burdine Hall 574, Austin, Texas 78712. Email: Colomina-Alminana_Juan@austin.utexas.edu