Book Reviews 163 could consider both bioethics and political philosophy as different types of practice that have their own immanent goal (telos): to improve medical procedures and political institutions. Here rational discourse is a part of these practices and it serves to help achieve a concrete goal. This goal, obviously, as Hartman says, is immanent to the practice, but transcendent to the thinking. Hartman does admit that philosophical speculation is futile to some extent. Philosophy does not give us anything that does not belong to thinking. Philosophy is thinking for the sake of thinking. Therefore, it seems that we can disregard the above-mentioned objections: pre-critical approaches expect from philosophy a certain result or a certain final resolution. This kind of demand cannot be fulfilled by thinking. Jan Piasecki Jagiellonian University, Kraków Richard Dien Winfield, From Concept to Objectivity. Thinking Through Hegel’s Subjective Logic, Aldershot: Ashgate 2006, pp. 150, ISBN 0-7546-5536-9. Books on Hegel are usually of two kinds. Some of them are detailed and extensive historical commentaries focused on his works, while others are short systematic introductions which aim to provide a key to his philosophy and often simply scratch the surface of Hegel’s texts. Richard Winfield’s From Concept to Objectivity belongs to neither of these categories. This book might be called a “systematic commentary” to Hegel’s Science of Logic. It is systematic since it seeks to solve philosophical problems considered in their own right. Yet the book is also a commentary, since it closely follows the text and explains Hegel’s way of thinking. The book is implicitly divided into two main parts. The first three chapters present the principles of Hegel’s logic and might be roughly considered a commentary on the introduction and the first chapter of the Science of Logic. The second part of the book, consisting of the remaining five chapters, concerns the more detailed problems of logic and focuses on the beginning of Book Three of the Science of Logic. I will examine each of the chapters in the order in which they appear, paying special attention to the two central problems presented by Winfield, namely the issue of logic in general and the problem of concrete universality. Afterwards I shall attempt to formulate some critical remarks. The book begins as a highly systematic study. Philosophy, to legitimate its own aspirations to truth, must somehow justify the authority of reason. Reason however falls into a fatal dilemma: if it starts with some given presuppositions it becomes dogmatic, but if it begins with no assumptions,