Gerhard Ernst, Die Objektivität der Moral Paderborn: mentis, 2008, ISBN 978-3-89785-234-1, € 29.80 (paperback) Andree Hahmann Accepted: 12 September 2008 / Published online: 1 October 2008 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008 Keywords Meta-ethics . Morality . Moral truths The aim of Die Objektivität der Moral is to solve a problem that the author identifies as the central question of meta-ethics, namely the problem of the objectivity of morality. The ultimate goal of this work is to uphold the view that morality can claim objectivity in the same way as the sciences. According to Ernst, all previous approaches in meta- ethics fail in answering this question because they all fall under a trilemma that he works out in his book. The author begins by enumerating several features peculiar to morality. To begin with, moral statements are intrinsically normative. Moreover, moral truths are related to the world and coalesce with non-moral truths. In addition, moral beliefs have a motivational force for the rational actor. Furthermore, moral cognition is neither of an obviously empirical nor formal type and frequently is not sufficient for a decision between conflicting opinions. Due to these peculiarities, (a) morality seems to be different from the sciences. But nevertheless, (b) we intuitively think that morality can claim objectivity. Moreover, (c) we are tempted to think that only what is of the same kind as the sciences can claim objectivity. According to Ernst, the trilemma of morality is that we hold these three contradictory propositions to be true at the same time (pp. 66–67). Ernst identifies three different approaches to the trilemma. The anti-objectivist rejects objectivity, the anti-dualist denies that there is a difference between morality and the sciences, and the anti-monopolist rejects the thesis that only the sciences can claim objectivity. The fundamental problem of all three positions is, according to Ernst, the absence of the right object of comparison, i.e. they cannot make clear what objectivity means without referring to the sciences. Ernst confronts in particular the anti-objectivist with two questions: What are moral beliefs and what is moral knowledge? Why do we talk about moral knowledge, truth and beliefs? According to Ernst, neither of these questions can satisfactorily be answered by the Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2009) 12:317–319 DOI 10.1007/s10677-008-9133-7 A. Hahmann (*) Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany e-mail: ahahman@gwdg.de