Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2013), pp. 675–702 doi:10.1093/ojls/gqt018 Published Advance Access August 11, 2013 Legal Pluralism and International Human Rights Law: Inherently Incompatible, Mutually Reinforcing or Something in Between? Helen Quane* Abstract—The relationship between legal pluralism and international human rights law is a complex and multi-faceted one. To fully appreciate the nature of this relationship, one has to desegregate the various forms of legal pluralism and analyse whether in their existence or operation they are compatible with international human rights law. This article undertakes such an exercise drawing on the jurisprudence of global and regional human rights bodies. In doing so, it goes beyond a mechanical audit of legal pluralism in the light of specific human rights and explores more foundational issues such as the nature and extent of a State’s human rights obligations when legal pluralism exists within its borders, the possibility of waiving human rights and questions of cultural relativism which hover over any discussion of legal pluralism. What emerges from this analysis is that a tentative conceptual framework exists to regulate the relationship between legal pluralism and international human rights law. It is one that not only requires the State to render legal pluralism compatible with human rights but also stipulates the process by which this should be done. Effectively implemented, it can achieve this objective and harness the pull of religious and customary law to ensure the more effective protection of human rights. Keywords: legal pluralism, international human rights law, religious law, customary law 1. Introduction Legal pluralism is not simply an historical anachronism found in former colonies or a phenomenon associated with theocratic states. 1 In its various * Swansea University. Email: h.quane@swansea.ac.uk. The author would like to thank the anonymous OJLS referees for their very helpful comments on this paper. 1 For an overview of the various forms of legal pluralism and the reasons for its existence: see eg International Council on Human Rights Policy, When Legal Worlds Overlap: Human Rights, State and Non-State Law (2009) 1–15 (ICHRP Report). ß The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com at York University Libraries on February 14, 2014 http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from