1 The Operational Methods of the Late Roman Army in the Persian War of 572-591 Frank R. Trombley Cardiff University (Wales) The Strategikon of Maurice, published in the first quarter of the seventh century, gives the clear picture of a well- defined system of tactical training and method that was being implemented in the last decade of the sixth century, in the wars against the Avars and Slavs in Illyricum and Thrace. 1 The wars of the later sixth century provided the proving ground for the fully developed system reflected in this tactical manual, as comparison with the military histories of that century reveals. Harder to grasp are the operational methods of the late sixth-century armies, which are often only implicitly hinted at in the narratives of Procopius, Agathias and Theophylact Simocatta. 2 There are also questions about the overall political aims of the regime in Constantinople, that is, the economic advantages and power configurations it was seeking to achieve or protect. 3 In what follows, I intend to look at the Oecumenical History of Theophylact Simocatta and its treatment of the Persian War of 572-591, as it gives a broadly coherent account based on official and semi-official versions. 4 As such this is an artificial construction, since ongoing operations against the Avars in Thrace and Illyricum exercised a powerful influence on the situation in Oriens and Armenia, particularly in terms of manpower deficits and the commitment of revenues. 5 The regime in Constantinople was well aware of its operational overreach, and the Sasanid ambassador Andigan played 1 Maurikios, Stratēgikon. On broader questions, see Grosse 1920. Apart from general histories, there have been few studies specifically addressing military personnel, operations and intelligence. Among them are Lee 1993, 109-128, Maspero 1912a, Maspero 1912b and Cameron 1995. Cf. Intelligence, military, in Margiotta 1996: 506-520, and Trombley 2005 (provisional analysis). 2 This can also be said of the narratives of Menander Protector and John of Epiphaneia, whose histories survive only as fragments. On the importance of John’s history as a source for Theophylact Simocatta, see Olajos 1988: 14-66, 96-106. 3 See broadly Stein 1919: 1-25, as well as Goubert 1951 and Christensen 1944. The regime in Constantinople had an interest in canalising the silk trade to its own hands. Tate 1999. This led to diplomatic manoeuvres with the Kindite Arabs and Axumite empire, causing tensions with the Sasanid monarchy, but the issues that brought about the Persian War of 572-591 were, among other things, Justin II’s support for the Armenian insurrection of 571/2 and political problems in Constantinople caused by the annual payments to the Persian king. Turtledove 1983. 4 Theophylact Simocatta, Historiae: 1887 and 1986. Whitby 1988 (essential). See the source collection in Greatrex and Lieu 2002: 141- 175. 5 On the Avars in 6 th c. Thrace and Illyricum, see Pohl 1988: 58-93. On their impact on Illyricum and Thrace, see Velkov 1977: 52-59, etc. Whitby 1988: 140-156. Curta 2001: 90-107. upon this at a conference near Dara with the Roman negotiator Zachariah in 581-582: 6 [The] Roman Empire, which is facing a large number of enemies, is fighting in many parts of the world and has its forces divided in hostilities with almost every barbarian nation… You are at war with many peoples, we with you alone; thus the necessity for the treaty… [So] we shall surely conquer since we have a dispute with no one other than the Romans and since we are committed to only one war. I hope to show that, by this time, the Late Roman army was practising a type of operational method that foresaw and applied particular solutions to particular problems of managing armies and handling enemy forces, and that this had a conceptual framework that found its culmination in the Strategikon of Maurice. There were therefore criteria against which the success or failure of a particular operation could be measured by the time the Strategikon was published. Operations What was an ‘operation’ in the context of the Persian War of 572-591? In general, it involved the movement or positioning of a large force to further the overall aims of the war: weakening the Sasanid’s military strength by the destruction of their armies, capture of defensive installations, disruption of their civil population and the tax revenue it contributed through taking captives or outright killing, and the destruction of agricultural capital in the territories of the Sasanid cities. 7 The long-term aim was to break the will of the Sasanid monarch, or that of his nobles, to wage war. 8 The Roman armies came tantalisingly close to these aims at different times, particularly in 578 not long before Khusrau I’s death, but disagreements about the final settlement intervened to prevent definitive peace negotiations taking place before he died. The Syrian church historian John of Ephesus has 6 Menander Protector, Fr. 26 (Blockley 1985: 230f. and note 303). Blockley puts these negotiations in the winter of 580-81. The date is immaterial to the thrust of the present argument. 7 For the implicit dependence of Sasanid revenues on agricultural production, see Rubin 1995: 292. The rationale for this kind of warfare is succinctly set forth, albeit for a different period, in Smail 1956: 25. On basic concepts of grand strategy, see Liddell Hart 1967: 333-372. 8 For example, in 586 the Persians attempted to end the war through the agency of the archbishop of Nisibis. The Romans had however implemented new tactical systems and operational procedures, and were perhaps loath to conclude hostilities without testing their newly acquired capabilities, culminating in the battle of the Solachon plain.