Book Review, forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies. Feeling Extended: Sociality as Extended Body-Becoming-Mind Douglas Robinson Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013 In Feeling Extended, Douglas Robinson discusses the extended cognition thesis (EC), with the aim of establishing the view that affect is extended transcranially and tends to result in intersubjective conation. The author is concerned with showing that the primary area in which minds extend is phenomenally: ‘affective-becoming-conative sociality’, so Robinson argues, is the real dimension in which the ‘body-becoming- mind’ extends 1 . Unfortunately, despite the book’s interesting focus on affect, conation and qualia, Feeling Extended is not, in my view, a good contribution to the contemporary literature on EC. For example, although the book is intended as a philosophical treatment of EC, the author makes use of the thesis of cognitive extension in a misleading way. Robinson explicitly states that he rejects the “notion that the mind is material” (2013, p. 3). But this conflicts with EC, where most (if not all) defenders and critics take EC to be a thesis about physical or material extension of the mind, including the physical mechanisms from which the mind arises. It also follows that Robinson’s development of EC runs counter to the endorsement of naturalism – a foundational commitment of everyone involved in discussions over EC. In the literature, naturalism is often understood (minimally) to imply that physicalism is true: whatever stuff there is, it is physical stuff. The issue just raised is reverberated by Robinson in this passage: “I accept the idea that mind extends – most enthusiastically in the context of the embodied mind, or the enactive mind, in which the mind’s interactions with the body and the surrounding world are constitutive of thought and so inseparable from thought. And I accept the claim that these interactions are material events that can be studied empirically. To the extent that we want to understand those interactions as mind, however, they are […] phenomenologies, felt by human subjects – not material events susceptible to empirical study.” (2013, p. 5; first and third italics added) On the face of it, this looks to be a contradiction. It is argued that the mind’s interactions with the body and world are material events. However, it is also said that if these interactions are understood as mind, then they are not material events. The claim that minds are not material should come as a surprise given the book’s subject matter, because it leads Robinson to put forth the claim that minds are not physical events that can be studied empirically. But if minds are not material, viz., causal-physical, what are they? According to Robinson, minds are phenomenologies. Unfortunately this explanation just pushes the confusion downstream, since Robinson also says that the felt experience of cognitive extension 1 In this review, I shall use the hyphenated style adopted by Robinson to stress the coming into being of mind.