In August 1918, less than three months before the First World War came to an end, the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, explained to his War Cabinet, why, according to the latest intelligence assess- ments, Germany was likely to keep on fighting for a number of years. Almost exactly twenty-five years later, in September 1943 (shortly after Italy’s surrender), the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, trying to avoid a comparably embarrassing misjudgement, came to the fol- lowing conclusion in its final report: We may see the defection of the rest of Germany’s European Allies and, even before the end of this year, convince the German people and military leaders that a continuation of the war is more to be feared than the consequences of inevitable defeat. With the German people no longer willing to endure useless bloodshed and destruction, and the military leaders convinced of the futility of resistance there might be, as in Italy, some sudden change of regime to prepare the way for a request for an armistice. 1 The fact that the two assessments mentioned here both proved to be fundamentally wrong seems to support the view held by many 18 * This article is based on a lecture given at the GHIL on 30 March 2004. A more detailed and fully referenced account of the argument of this article can be found in my essay, ‘Hitler, der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Choreographie des Untergangs’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 26 (2000), pp. 493–518. 1 War Cabinet/Joint Sub-Commitee, ‘Probabilities of a German Collapse’, J. I. C. (43) 367 Final of 9. 9. 1943, p. 3/no. 11 (National Archives, Washington D.C.: ABC 381 Germany, 29. 1. 1943, Sec. 1-A). ARTICLE THE IDEOLOGY OF SELF-DESTRUCTION HITLER AND THE CHOREOGRAPHY OF DEFEAT * by Bernd Wegner