Security for Sale: The Great Game of the U.S. - )ndian Civil Nuclear Cooperation Treaty and its )mplications for China and Pakistan Patrick Mendis & Leah Green Abstract In this analysis of the evolution of the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation pact, the authors argue that the bilateral treaty marked the beginning of a new era for global non-proliferation as envisioned by the Bush administration and subsequently endorsed by President Barack Obama. An exploration of the forces at work reveals powerful special interests that scored massive commercial and trade deals to supply India with parts and technology. The unintended consequences of such action included a precedent for Chinese support of Pakistan’s nuclear program and the potential detriment to American interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Introduction: The Bush World Using key allies appointed to the U.S. Department of State and an aura of secrecy, President George W. Bush struck an unprecedented agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with )ndia in October . Forcefully backed by the )ndian Diaspora, K Street lobbyists and powerful corporate interests, industry giants—such as Boeing, Raytheon and General Electric—scored massive contracts to supply the subcontinent with reactor parts, space and defense related components and technologies. The Council on Foreign Relations characterized the deal as a Dzwatersheddz moment in U.S.-)ndia relations, introducing Dza new aspect to international non- proliferation efforts.dz  )n the wake of the agreement, Dzhotspotdz countries like North Korea, )ran and Pakistan continue to pose a serious challenge to the foreign policy aims of the Barack Obama administration as well as the international non-proliferation regime precisely at a time of weakened credibility due to the Bush accord.  As the most powerful and responsible member of the global nuclear regime, the United States permitted an exemption to the rules of access to civilian nuclear development for former outsider )ndia. This allowed New Delhi to achieve its nuclear ambitions within relatively lax global governing conditions, and thus weakened international oversight of the nuclear trade. Within the framework of established global non-proliferation norms, countries like Brazil, Egypt, South Africa and Turkey either give up or abstain from nuclear weapons development programs in order to stabilize regional balances of power. Yet, no such requirements were made of )ndia. Now, the increased profile of aspiring nuclear powers in regional hotspots ȋi.e., )ran and North KoreaȌ combined with seemingly bendable global rules for nuclear supply may see the U.S.-)ndia pact usher in a new age of nuclear power, whether for civilian purposes or military posture. As the United States introduced the possibility of nuclear favorites—granting access privileges to states outside the global non-proliferation regime—other nuclear weapons states capable of playing the role of benefactor ȋsuch as ChinaȌ are poised to follow in kind with their preferred ally ȋsuch as PakistanȌ. )ndeed, it appears that a new wave of nuclear proliferation—the likes of which has not been witnessed since the years immediately following WW)) when the USSR, the United Kingdom, France and China confirmed their nuclear status in relatively rapid succession could most certainly lie ahead. The Bush administrationǯs decision to negotiate the pact with )ndia concluded nearly three decades of nuclear isolation for the subcontinent following )ndiaǯs  nuclear test. After )ndia joined the nuclear club, relations with the United States remained weak and often antagonistic.