Erik Myin (2000) Direct Self-consciousness. Psycoloquy: 11(003) Self Consciousness (2) Volume: 11 (next , prev ) Issue: 003 (next , prev ) Article: 2 (next prev first ) Alternate versions: ASCII Summary Topic: Self consciousness View Topic Article: 2) Myin 11(003) Direct Self-consciousness Book Review View Article PSYCOLOQUY (ISSN 1055-0143) is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA). DIRECT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS Book Review of Bermudez on Self-Consciousness Erik Myin Department of Philosophy & Artificial Intelligence Lab Vrije Universiteit Brussel Pleinlaan 2 B 1050 Brussels BELGIUM http://homepages.vub.ac.be/~emyin/ emyin@vub.ac.be Abstract One can distinguish the descriptive view of self-consciousness from the philosophical framework of the theory of nonconceptual content. Propositional attitudes can be ascribed without commitment to the existence of internal states that bear different species of content. The descriptive view can be coupled to this alternative view. Keywords cognitive maps; concepts; content; ecological self; navigation; proprioception; self-consciousness; self- reference; visual perception I. INTRODUCTION 1. The bulk of Bermudez's (1998, 1999) excellent book consists of a descriptive view of the content of self-consciousness. It shows how more complicated forms of self-consciousness emerge, progressing from a mere sensitivity to Gibsonian affordances, and ultimately leading to a conception of oneself as a psychological subject in a social space shared with equally self-conscious persons. This descriptive story is full of theoretical insight and impressively informed by empirical work. Parallel to the development of this descriptive view is its integration into a philosophical theory that is concerned primarily with the existence of different species of content, and with the necessity of postulating the existence of different