German History Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23–41 © The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the German History Society. All rights reserved. doi:10.1093/gerhis/ghs124 The Ambassadorship of Hans Adolf von Moltke (1943): The Turning Point in German–Spanish Relations during the Second World War * Emilio Sáenz-Francés Francoist foreign policy during World War II was complex and controversial. For his apologists, the Caudillo’s providential wisdom recognized the dangers of an alliance with the Axis powers from the outset, and strove to keep Spain out of the war. For many historians, the objective of the regime’s policy was to provide as much support to the Axis prior to Spanish entry into the war at the most opportune moment. In real- ity, while it is clearly the case that for much of the conlict’s duration Franco favoured the Axis over the Western Allies, he adopted a cautious policy designed to preserve Spanish independence and freedom of action by avoiding binding commitments to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. 1 Above all, Franco was determined to ensure that the ‘political families’ within the regime—the Church, the Falange and the army—would not be in a position to capitalize on the changing international situation to challenge his authority within Spain. 2 Irrespective of the ierce debates concerning the ultimate aims of Franco’s foreign policy, historians have generally agreed that it was in the autumn of 1940, during the negotiations with the Nazis which culminated in the inconclusive October meeting between Hitler and Franco at Hendaye, that Spain came closest to a declaration of war. 3 However, based on the hitherto unknown diaries of Hans Adolf von Moltke and the memoirs of Eberhard von Stohrer (German ambassadors in Madrid between 1939 and 1943), and the memoirs of Hans Lazar, the wartime German press attaché, this article argues that the Nazis intensiied their eforts to secure Spanish entry into the war following ‘Operation Torch’, the Allied landings in North Africa, in order to shore up their strategic position in the western Mediterranean. 4 It concludes that the failure of these eforts during von Moltke’s brief tenure as ambassador from January to March * I would like to thank professors Julius Ruiz, Paul Addison and Jill Stephenson of the University of Edinburgh for their kind advice in preparing this manuscript. 1 See E. Sáenz-Francés, ‘Spanish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: A Historiographical Overview’, in C. Levai (ed.), Europe and the World in European Historiography (Pisa, 2006), pp. 49–70. 2 For an excellent study of the different ‘political families’ see A. de Miguel, Sociología del Franquismo (Barcelona, 1978). 3 See S.G. Payne, El Régimen de Franco (Madrid, 1987), pp. 281–323; J. Tusell, Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial: Entre el Eje y la Neutralidad (Madrid, 1995), pp. 83–203; E. Sáenz-Francés, Entre la Antorcha y la Esvástica: Franco en la Encucijada de la II Guerra Mundial (San Sebastian de los Reyes, 2009), pp. 66–71. See also the last work of Stanley Payne on this topic: S.G. Payne, Franco and Hitler (New Haven, 2008). 4 Although the original manuscripts are missing, a Spanish language copy of the diaries of von Moltke (hence- forth MSVM) is held in Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación (Madrid) (MAEC), R4506/37. This copy reached the ministry in February 1956, provided by the Spanish journalist and historian, Jesús Evaristo Casariego, through the channel of the Spanish ambassador in Argentina, José María Alfaro. Casariego—at that by guest on February 23, 2013 http://gh.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from