Ownership 1 Japanese Name 1 Chinese Name 2 , Taiwan Square kilo- meters 1 Maximum Elevation 3 meters State 2012.9.11 Uotsuri-jima( 魚釣島) Tiao-yu-t’ai( 釣魚台) Hoapin-san( 和平山) 3.6 383 State 2012.9.11 Minami-kojima( 南小島) Nan-hsiao( 南小島) 0.32 149 State 2012.9.11 Kita-kojima( 北小島) Pei-hsiao( 北小島) 0.26 135 Private, Kobi Sho Gunnery Range 1972 Kuba-jima( 久場島) Huang-wei-yu( 黄尾嶼) 0.87 117 State, Sekibi Sho Gunnery Range 1972 Taisho-jima( 大正島) Ch’ih-wei-yu( 赤尾嶼) 0.04 84 State Okino-kitaiwa( 沖北岩) Pei-hsiao( 北礁) 0.05 28 State Okino-minamiiwa( 沖南岩) Nan-hsiao( 南礁) 0.01 17 State Tobi-se( 飛瀬) no name 0.02 n. a. Table 1 Name of Senkaku/ Tiao-yu/Diao-Yu islands Source: 1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Japan’s Basic Position on the Senkaku Islands and Facts, October 2012. 2. Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Okinawa Reversion Treaty, Annex to Hearings, October 27, 28 and 29, 1971. p. 5. 3. Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations, University Hawaii Press, 2000. The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 2, No. 3, January 13, 2014. The Origins of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute between China, Taiwan and Japan 中・台・日における尖閣・魚釣問題の起源 中・台・日における尖閣・魚釣問題の起源 Yabuki Susumu with an introduction by Mark Selden This article introduces Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) documents and Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearings on the Senkaku dispute to clarify Japanese, Chinese and United States positions on the historical origins and contemporary trajectory of the Senkaku/Diaoyu (hereafter, Senkaku) dispute. Introduction Yabuki Susumu, in a series of articles and talks, has rigorously mined the historical record of China (PRC/ROC)-Japan-US relations to illuminate the background to the dangerous conflict that presently threatens to bring war to the Western Pacific in the wake of Japanese nationalization of three of the Senkaku islands in September 2012. While other important issues add to the gravity of the conflict, including enlarged territorial claims by China, Japan and Korea in the form of advancing and defending competing claims to ADIZ in the East China and South China Seas, Yabuki shows the long trajectory of competing claims over the Senkaku dispute and the evolving policies of China, Japan and the United States in shaping it. Since so much of the international discussion of the issues has focused on China-Japan conflict, a particularly important contribution of the present paper is its clear presentation of US recognition at the highest levels of the significance of the competing territorial claims, and its maneuvering in negotiations with Taipei, Tokyo, and Beijing to shape the outcome. The story can, of course, be traced back to earlier claims to the islands, including historical interactions involving Taiwan and Okinawan fishermen and Chinese tributary missions, to Japanese claims to the islands, and to their disposition by the US in framing and implementing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The treaty set the stage for the transfer of the Senkaku to Japan in 1972 at the time of the reversion of administrative rights to Okinawa. But the story told here pivots on the detailed negotiations between Washington and Taipei in 1971 in the context of the US-China opening. What it shows is keen awareness of the Senkaku question by the ROC as early as 1970 in the context of US preparation for the reversion of Okinawa, and preoccupation with the issue by both Kissinger and Nixon as they prepare the 1971 US-China opening at the time of Ping Pong Diplomacy and discussions of PRC resumption of the UN Security Council Seat. An ROC Note Verbale to the State Department of March 15, 1971 made the historical and contemporary case for Chinese possession of the Senkaku islands. Following close attention to its content, in the shadow of demonstrations over the islands on Taiwan, Kissinger handwrote in the margin, “But that is nonsense since it gives islands to Japan. How can we get a more neutral position?” The authoritative legal position of the US was given at the time of the Fulbright Hearings on reversion in the form of a memorandum of October 20, 1971 by Robert I Starr, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Noting the dispute over the Senkaku between China and Japan, it noted that “The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims (of ROC and/or PRC).” It would remain for China and Japan to negotiate their disposition. At no time thereafter has the US legal position changed. MS On September 11, 2013, the Japanese government decided to nationalize three islets of the Senkaku’s eight island group. The Chinese government strongly protested the nationalization of the islets to the Japanese government, and on September 15 published a white paper on the “Diaoyutai Issue.” 1 On September 18, on the anniversary of Japan’s seizure of Manchuria in 1931, Chinese in a number of cities demonstrated in a so- called “one million demonstration.” Some of the demonstrators destroyed shops and factories. Thus Japan-China relations deteriorated to the lowest point since normalization in September 1972. On September 25, the United States published Senkaku (Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations. 2 On September 28, the Taiwan Government published a white paper titled, Riben Zhanju Diaoyu de Lishi Zhengju (Historical Evidence of Japanese Occupation of Tiaoyu) . 3 In October, the Foreign Ministry of Japan announced Senkaku-shotō no Ryōyūken ni tsuite no Kihon- Kenkai (English version: Basic Position on the Senkaku Islands and Facts), and asserted that ‘the Senkaku Islands are indisputably an inherent part of the territory of Japan in light of historical facts and based upon international law’. 4 One year after the dispute erupted, the Beijing Olympic Committee voted in favor of Tokyo hosting the 2020 Olympics, and non-government level exchanges between both countries began to normalize. However, political relations remain frozen and show no signs of thawing. Why did Japanese-China relations fall into this snare? To answer this question, we must reconsider the Okinawa Reversion Treaty of some 40 years ago. SCENE One: The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus In-depth critical analysis of the forces shaping the Asia-Pacific...and the world.