Area: Mediterranean and Arab World ARI 34/2010 Date: 16/2/2010 The Priorities of Spain’s EU Presidency in the Mediterranean: Ideal and Reality (ARI) Iván Martín * Theme: Spain’s EU Presidency poses major challenges for the country’s interests and strategic clout in the Mediterranean, in the new regional geopolitical context that has emerged in the wake of the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). 1 Summary: Above and beyond the developments in the disputes that are ongoing in the region, in which Spain has very limited scope for influence, Spain ‘is eagerly awaited’ and is expected to bring the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) back on track after two years of strong leadership –often to the extent of unilateralism– from France, and unprecedented political deadlock since the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was first launched in 1995. Spain’s prestige and strategic position in the region are at stake: if Spain confines its role to simply ‘managing’ the UfM during its term at the helm of the EU, without giving it a firm political boost based on specific proposals and initiatives, it will have let what is almost certainly a unique opportunity slip by. Its contribution could be more efficient in relation to institutional aspects or in defining and monitoring certain priority sector-specific strategies than in purely political-diplomatic matters. Analysis: ‘It will be hard for you to accept this, but although Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos is one of the world’s leading specialists on the subject, we recommend that you forget about the Middle East, the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean’. Such was the advice to Spain’s Prime Minister from two leading Spanish specialists in international relations in regard to this region in June 2009. 2 This was all they had to say on the subject, and they immediately went on to discuss the Middle-East conflict and bilateral policy towards Morocco and Algeria. This simplistic and expedient approach reflects the lack of interest which many of Spain’s own experts in international relations display in regard to Euro-Mediterranean affairs and, specifically, their multilateral aspects, and it is in stark contrast with the specialised expertise in the region which some of the country’s most prominent diplomats possess. Another relatively widespread position among analysts and stakeholders alike is that the political difficulties at the UfM hammered the final nail into the Euro-Mediterranean Process’s coffin. 3 * Associate Researcher at Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI). 1 This ARI is based on the author’s presentations at two seminars held in June 2009 by Fundació CIDOB in Barcelona and the Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid, in both cases jointly with the British Council. I am grateful to all the speakers and participants at both events for their contribution to the discussion. 2 José María de Areilza & José Ignacio Torreblanca (2009), ‘Diagnóstico diferencial, política exterior’, Foreign Policy (Edición española), nr 33, p. 28-39. 3 See Kristina Kausch & Richard Youngs (2009), ‘The End of the Euro-Mediterranean Vision’, International Affairs, vol. 85.5, p. 963-76. 1