Color Constancy and the Color/Value Analogy * Joshua Gert “Color Constancy and the Color/Value Analogy,” Ethics, Vol. 121, No. 1 (2010), pp. 58-87. Please cite published version. The analogy between evaluative properties and secondary qualities has a long and respectable history, and is currently enjoying a period of renewed attention. 1 As a strategy for the demystification of evaluative properties, reliance on the analogy has seemed promising for a number of reasons. Surely at least our concepts of properties such as the colors depend in some strong way on human responses, so that their extensions are non-coincidentally related to the nature of the human visual system. And it seems equally plausible that our evaluative concepts have a similarly intimate tie to human nature and to what we find important, aversive, attractive, and so on. Moreover, a research program based on the analogy has proven to be extremely fertile, since there are so many different ways in which to develop it. Indeed, the analogy can underwrite anti-realist views as easily as realist ones, as long as the appropriate auxiliary premises are defended. 2 Still, those who appeal to the analogy tend to come down on the realistic side, and to advocate versions of a view that has come to be called ‘response-dependent realism’. The present paper offers some support to those who defend such views. Realistic response-dependent accounts of value centrally feature a biconditional of the following sort: x has value V  subjects of kind S would have response R to x under circumstances of kind C. They also include the claim that the direction of explanation – at least for some important sort of explanation – runs from the claim about the responses of subjects to the claim about the value of