India Review, vol. 4, no. 2, April, 2005, pp. 125–143 Copyright © 2005 Taylor & Francis Inc. ISSN 1473-6489 print DOI:10.1080/14736480500225608 FIND 1473-6489 0000-0000 India Review, Vol. 04, No. 02, July 2005: pp. 0–0 India Review International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence India Review RAJESH M. BASRUR India’s adoption of “credible minimum deterrence” has not been accompanied by a clear enunciation of the assumptions and principles underlying the doctrine. What exactly is meant by “minimum”? On what basis has India chosen to adopt a minimal posture that is tolerant of apparent imbalances in quality and quantity vis-à-vis at least one of its nuclear adversaries? None of the doctrinal pronouncements issued so far – from the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) of 1999 to the Press Release of January 2003 – has sought to explain these terms. 1 A thor- ough articulation would go further in delineating the relationship between nuclear weapons and the political world as it is constituted today. What is the role of force in the contemporary international sys- tem? How relevant are nuclear weapons to this world? Most writings by Indian strategic thinkers have paid scant attention, if any, to such questions. 2 Below, I attempt to remedy this shortcoming. This paper establishes the context for minimum deterrence through the lens of international relations (IR) theory. It first examines the essential nature of world politics as seen through competing schools of thought or paradigms. The relevance of force and of nuclear weapons is then assessed. I go on to discuss the special characteristics of nuclear weap- ons and show the relationship between these characteristics and mini- mum deterrence. I conclude with a discussion on what this means for policy as well as for theory. I do not attempt here a discussion of the alternatives to minimum deterrence, including assured destruction, limited deterrence, and vir- tual deterrence. 3 Nor do I attempt to consider at length the possible uses of nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence, such as coercive diplomacy or the attainment of prestige and influence. Rather, I confine myself to explicating the fundamentals of a theory of Rajesh M. Basrur is Director of the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai.