OUT OF EQUILIBRIUM: A POSITIVE THEORY OF PARTIES AND REPRESENTATION Michael D. McDonald mdmcd@binghamton.edu Aida Paskeviciute aidap@binghamton.edu Robin Best rbest1@binghamton.edu Rachel Cremona rachelcremona@hotmail.com Department of Political Science Binghamton University (SUNY) Binghamton, NY 13902-6000 Voice: 607 777-2946 Fax: 607 777-2675 Abstract. Most theories of party competition predict that parties converge to the center on policy issues; the world around us tells us that is not so; and the obvious contradiction has sent recent theorizing on a long, difficult search for divergent party equilibria. Empirical analysts have had an easier time. They take for granted divergent party positions, but, armed with that ‘fact’, they report that the role of parties in producing accurate representation is at best conditional upon electoral system features and other institutional arrangements. Working from the diverse coalition model of parties, we argue that theory has it right: parties do not have equilibrium policy positions. Building on that premise, we create a series of simulations to explore whether dis-equilibrated party position taking is the missing reality that brings about accurate representation. We conclude that it is.