I know. Therefore, I understand Berit Brogaard February 26, 2005 The so-called Meno problem is one of the recent trendy topics in epistemology. 1 In a nutshell, the Meno problem is that of explaining why we value knowledge more than true belief. In his recent book The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jon Kvanvig argues quite convincingly that no existing account of knowledge can accommodate the intuition that the value of knowledge exceeds the value of true belief. 2 Kvanvig regards this as an incentive to revise our beliefs about what epistemology is all about. In the past knowledge has been one of the most central concepts of epistemology, but owing to the intractability of Meno-style problems, it is now time to revise our practices. Kvanvig suggests that we shift our epistemological focus from knowledge to understanding. Understanding, Kvanvig alleges, involves a grasp of the explanatory and other coherence-making relationships in a larger body of information. Because of this, the value of understanding exceeds both the value of true belief and the value of knowledge. In this paper I take issue with these contentions. I argue that knowledge is just understanding (plus perhaps an anti-luck requirement). Hence, if understanding is more valuable than true belief, so is knowledge. After showing that the value of understanding does not exceed the value of knowledge, I go on to argue that the value of understanding does not exceed the 1 See e.g. M. R. Depaul, “Is Truth Our Epistemic End?” (Pacific Division APA, 1989), L. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 300-302, “The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good”, Metaphilosophy 34 (2003): 12-28, W. Jones, “Why Do We Value Knowledge?”, American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 423-40, J. Kvanvig, “Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?” The Monist 81 (1998): 426-51, and W. D. Riggs, “Reliability and the Value of Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 79-96. 2 The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003) 1