B.J.Pol.S. 34, 87–108 Copyright  2004 Cambridge University Press DOI: 10.1017/S000712340300036X Printed in the United Kingdom Determinants of Legislative Turnover: A Cross-National Analysis RICHARD E. MATLAND AND DONLEY T. STUDLAR* Two decades of turnover data were collected for the national legislature of twenty-five industrialized countries. After a discussion of turnover’s significance, we compare turnover rates across countries. A set of variables expected to influence turnover rates is described and multiple regression is used to test the hypotheses developed. Results show that frequency of elections, opportunity for double listings, electoral volatility and legislative institutionalization have statistically significant effects on turnover. In addition the type of electoral system (majoritarian versus proportional representation) is shown to have a statistically and substantively significant effect, with turnover much greater in the latter. Possible explanations for this effect are explored. ‘Little is known systematically about how turnover rates vary country to country …’ Robert D. Putnam 1 ‘Since much of the work on legislative turnover has been confined to the United States, we lack recent comparative data.’ Pippa Norris 2 WHY TURNOVER IS IMPORTANT Comparative legislative turnover is a fundamental topic in the study of political science, yet it has received little attention. This article brings together the largest amount of data collected to this point on legislative turnover in order to describe basic comparative legislative turnover and to explain why variations exist in turnover patterns over a period of two decades, from the mid-1970s to mid-1990s. The ability to bring about change in legislative personnel is important for theories of elite circulation, 3 for creating opportunity structures for aspiring political leaders and insurgent groups, 4 and for leading to changes in public policy. 5 Without circulation of * Department of Political Science, University of Houston; and Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, respectively. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the American Political Science Association Meetings, the European Consortium of Political Research Workshops; the Pennsylvania State University; and Trinity College, Dublin. The number of scholars and parliamentary information services that have helped us by contributing suggestions and data are too many to mention individually, but we appreciate them all. Al Olivetti of West Virginia University and Philip Michelbach of University of Houston served as research assistants. Richard Matland would like to thank the Research Council of Norway for their support of this research. 1 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976), p. 65. 2 Pippa Norris, ‘Conclusion: Comparative Legislative Recruitment in Western Democracies’, in Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris, eds, Gender and Party Politics (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 309–30, at p. 316. 3 Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, ed. and rev. by Arthur Livingston, trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939); Vilfredo Pareto, Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings, selected and introduced by S. E. Finer, trans. Derick Mirfin (New York: Praeger, 1966); Putnam, The Comparative Studies of Political Elites. 4 Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 5 Valerie Bunce, Do Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981); David W. Brady, Critical Elections and Congressional Policymaking (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988).