Misrepresenting consciousness Josh Weisberg Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 Abstract An important objection to the ‘‘higher-order’’ theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the particular extrinsic characterization of the HO theory, the ‘‘transitivity principle,’’ against its intrinsic rivals, thereby showing that the misrepresentation objection conclusively falls short. Keywords Consciousness Á Higher-order thought Á Misrepresentation Á Empty higher-order thought An essential first step in theorizing about consciousness is pinning down the data a theory must explain. In contemporary consciousness studies, two competing characterizations are widely used to fix the initial explanatory data. The first involves an intrinsic concept of consciousness, one tied to the experiential ‘‘feel’’ of a conscious state. The second involves an extrinsic concept of consciousness, one tied to the special connections a conscious state possesses or the special role it plays in a subject’s mental life. These initial conceptual steps can have an enormous impact on the direction and success of a theory; mischaracterizing the data can lead to the illusion of intractable problems or to the false promise of easy reduction. J. Weisberg (&) Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, 515 Agnes Arnold Hall, Houston, TX 77204, USA e-mail: jweisberg@uh.edu 123 Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9567-3