It is always risky to make sweeping statements about the development of philosophy, but if one were nevertheless asked to describe twentieth century philosophy in broad strokes, one noteworthy feature might be the following: Whereas important figures at the beginning of the century, figures such as Frege and Husserl, were very explicit in their rejection of naturalism (both are known for their rejection of the attempt to naturalize the laws of logic, that is, for their criticism of psychologism), the situation has changed considerably. Today many philosophers – not the least within analytical philosophy – would subscribe to some form of naturalism. In fact, naturalism is seen by many as the default metaphysical position. If you don’t sub- scribe to naturalism you must be subscribing to some form of Cartesian substance dualism. Thus, whereas 20 or 30 years ago one might have been inclined to char- acterize the development of twentieth century philosophy in terms of a linguistic turn, a turn from a philosophy of subjectivity to a philosophy of language, it might today be more apt to describe the development in terms of a turn from anti-naturalism to naturalism. What are the implications of this turn? It has some rather decisive metaphilo- sophical implications, that is, it has implications for the way we view the relation between philosophy and positive science. According to some readings, a commit- ment to naturalism simply amounts to taking one’s departure in what is natural (rather than supernatural), but I think it is fair to say that the use of the term in the current discourse mainly signals an orientation towards natural science. As Sellars famously put it, “in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not” (Sellars 1963, 173). However, insofar as naturalists would consider the scientific account of reality authoritative, a commitment to naturalism is bound to put pres- sure on the idea that philosophy (including phenomenology) can make a distinct and autonomous contribution to the study of reality. Naturalized Phenomenology Dan Zahavi 3 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_1, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 D. Zahavi Department of Media, Cognition and Communication & Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark S. Gallagher and D. Schmicking (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science,