1 Published in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 59/2, 1997, 304-321. Please quote only from published version. Dan Zahavi University of Copenhagen Horizontal Intentionality and Transcendental Intersubjectivity One of the problems confronting an interpretation of Husserl's late phenomenology is how to reconcile Husserl's increasing interest in the constitutive contribution of intersubjectivity with his introduction of the primordial reduction . How is it possible to characterize transcendental intersubjectivity as the foundation of truth and true being (Hua VIII 449, Hua IX 295, 344), and to claim simultanously that it is necessary to isolate the 'sphere of ownness' (that is, the primordial sphere encompassing everything which can be constituted by the ego itself, without any contribution from another subjectivity (Hua I 124, Hua XVII 248)), so that one can gain a comprehension of the constituted Seinsgeltung of the Other (Hua XV 270-71)? In a sense, the answer is relatively straightforward. Husserl insists that the primordial reduction is undertaken for methodological reasons in order to elucidate the exact founded-founding relationship between subjective and intersubjective constitution. Thus, we are dealing with an attempt at a precise and appropriate introduction of the founded , but constituting transcendental intersubjectivity, and Husserl can consequently maintain that the thorough implementation of the transcendental reduction will ultimately lead us (if not sooner, then later) to a phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity (Hua I 69, Hua IX 245-246, Hua VIII 129, 176). The main problem with this answer is, however, that Husserl's strategy seems to remain vulnerable to a number of substantial objections. Let me, for the sake of simplicity, merely mention the two most fundamental ones. The first is general in nature and ultimately concerned with Husserl's theory of constitution. Thus, it might be asked whether Husserl's approach does not willy-nilly lead to a transcendental solipsism, insofar as it is impossible to preserve the equality and transcendence of the Other the moment one starts to regard it as founded and constituted. The second is more specific in nature and questions the exact range of the primordial sphere. Thus, one might ask if Husserl does not overestimate the constitutive ability of the primordial ego, insofar as intersubjectivity is at play earlier than Husserl claims. In this article I want primarily to address the second problem. Taking Husserl's analysis of horizontal intentionality as my point of departure, I wish to demonstrate that my perceptual experience (constitution) of the Other is only possible if a certain kind of intersubjectivity is presupposed. Thus, it will be argued that intersubjectivity must already be at play prior to my concrete experience of the embodied Other, and, consequently, that this experience cannot be effectuated primordially. This conclusion will be supported by passages in Husserl's unpublished manuscripts, however, and thus the article also purports to present one aspect of the radical and fundamental intersubjective rethinking of the phenomenological project undertaken by Husserl in the last period of his thought; i.e. it will be shown (once more), that Husserl's final words on the question of intersubjectivity are not to be found in the Cartesian Meditations . Although I will not explicitly thematize Husserl's concept of constitution, and although the argument presented does not as such attempt to prove the impossibility (or uselessness) of the primordial reduction, 1 the conclusion will nevertheless be of pertinence when it comes to a refutation of transcendental solipsism: If the contribution of the Other is at play prior to my concrete experience of an Other, if it is independent of my factual encounter with an Other, intersubjectivity cannot be reduced to a contingent relation. It must belong a priori to the structure of constituting subjectivity. 1. An examination of Husserl's analysis of the intentional structure of our experience reveals that horizontal intentionality plays an important role in ordinary perception. By its very nature, the object of (transcendent) perception is characterized by its adumbrational givenness (cf. Ideas I § 42). When perceiving an object it is necessary to distinguish that which appears from the appearance, since the object is never given in its totality but always in a certain restricted profile. Despite this, the object of perception is exactly the appearing object and not its intuitively given profile. That is, perception furnishes us with a full object-consciousness, even though only part