© 2014, IJARCSMS All Rights Reserved 85 | P a g e ISSN: 232 7782 (Online) 1 Computer Science and Management Studies  International Journal of Advance Research in Volume 2, Issue 8, August 2014 Research Article / Survey Paper / Case Study Available online at: www.ijarcsms.com Securing AODV Protocol using Signature Based Techniques Pratik Buchke 1 Department of IT O.I.S.T. Bhopal – India Prof. Vineet Richharya 2 Department of CSE LNCT Bhopal – India Abstract: In Ad hoc network all nodes are mobile and can be connected dynamically in an arbitrary manner. No default router is available for routing. Since in an ad hoc network, a significant concern is the ability to route in the presence of Byzantine failures which include nodes that drop, fabricate, modify, or mis-route packets in an attempt to disrupt the routing service. As Byzantine fault occur in Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol. In this paper, we propose three methods for securing AODV protocol from Byzantine attacks by using Signature based techniques. These techniques are CME (Combine Message Encryption), CEM (Combine Encrypted Message) and ASM (Aggregate Signature of Messages). Finally, we compare our approach with AODV protocol. The results shown that the quality of service has been improved based on three parameters (delay, network load and throughput). Keywords: Ad-hoc; Networks; Protocols. I. INTRODUCTION Mobile ad-hoc wireless networks hold the promise of the future, with the capability to establish networks at anytime, anywhere. These networks don’t rely on extraneous hardware which makes them an ideal candidate for rescue and emergency operations. These networks are built, operated and maintained by its constituent wireless nodes. These nodes generally have a limited transmission range and so each node seeks the assistance of its neighboring nodes in forwarding packets. In order, to establish routes between nodes, which are farther than a single hop, specially configured routing protocols are engaged. The unique feature of these protocols is their ability to trace routes in spite of a dynamic topology. These protocols can by far and large be categorized into two main types: Reactive and Proactive [1]. The nodes in an ad-hoc network generally have limited battery power and so active routing protocols endeavor to save upon the same, by discovering routes only when they are essentially required. In contrast, proactive routing protocols establish and maintain routes at all instants of time, so as to avoid the latency that occurs during new route discoveries. Both types of routing protocols require persistent cooperative behavior, with intermediate nodes primarily contributing to the route development. Similarly each node, which practically acts like a mobile router [1], has absolute control over the data that passes through it. In essence, the membership of any adhoc networks indisputably calls for sustained depiction of benevolent behavior by all participating nodes. However, this is more than often difficult to achieve in an open environment and so these networks are frequently attacked by malicious nodes, which may originate internally or join externally. Two kinds of attacks can be launched against ad-hoc networks [2], Passive and Active. In passive attacks the attacker does not disturb the routing protocol. It only eavesdrops upon the routing traffic and endeavors to extract valuable information like node hierarchy and network topology from it. In active attacks, malicious nodes can disturb the correct functioning of a routing protocol by modifying routing information, by fabricating false routing information, and by impersonating other nodes[3]. Cryptographic mechanisms are commonly used to protect routing protocols by enforcing mutual trust relationships among the wireless nodes [4]. Security in mobile ad-hoc wireless networks is a two-fold problem. One is the security of the routing protocols that enable the nodes to communicate with each other and the second is the protection of the data that traverses the