Jakob Hohwy (In press). Prediction error minimization, mental and developmental disorder, and statistical theories of consciousness. In Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. R. Gennaro (ed.). MIT Press 2015. Jakob Hohwy, Cognition and Philosophy Lab, Monash University, Melbourne Australia. Jakob.Hohwy@monash.edu. 1 Prediction error minimization, mental and developmental disorder, and statistical theories of consciousness. Jakob Hohwy Monash University Abstract This chapter seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and developmental disorder demonstrates its relevance to consciousness. The resulting view is discussed in relation to a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely the idea that conscious perception depends on Bayesian metacognition; this theory is also supported by considerations of psychopathology. This Bayesian theory is first disconnected from the higher-order thought theory, and then, via a prediction error conception of action, connected instead to the global neuronal workspace theory. Considerations of mental and developmental disorder therefore show that a very general theory of brain function is relevant to explaining the structure of conscious perception; furthermore, this theory can subsume and unify two contemporary approaches to consciousness, in a move that seeks to elucidate the fundamental mechanism for selection of representational content into consciousness. 1. Introduction It is possible to distinguish top-down and bottom-up approaches to the task of constructing a theory of consciousness. Top-down approaches are by far the most common: begin with a list of characteristics of consciousness, then hypothesize a