Contemporary Pragmatism Editions Rodopi Vol. 10, No. 1 (June 2013), 131–143 ©2013 Talisse’s Epistemic Justification of Democracy Reconsidered Andrew F. Smith Paul Ott offers three related arguments that Robert Talisse’s epistemic conception of democracy fails. Together, they are intended to support the proposition that a Deweyan approach to democracy provides a better explanatory basis for how to facilitate democracy. I argue that each argument provided by Ott fails. As a result, they do not reflect a successful critique of the Talisse’s conception of democracy. Nor do they provide support for Ott’s defense of Dewey. I close by offering a more promising line of criticism against Talisse’s epistemic justification. 1. Introduction In a recent essay appearing in Contemporary Pragmatism, Paul Ott argues that Robert Talisse’s most recent iteration of his epistemic conception of democracy fails. He offers three related arguments to make his case: Argument 1 P 1 Moral pluralism, as Talisse characterizes it, is a plurality of “fundamentally held doctrines.” (Ott 2011, 146) P 2 A plurality of fundamentally held doctrines is democratically untenable. C 1 Democracy cannot accommodate moral pluralism, as Talisse under- stands it. Argument 2 P 1 Endorsement of Talisse’s epistemic justification is necessary for embracing Talisse’s conception of democracy. P 2 One cannot endorse both a fundamentally held doctrine and also be persuaded by Talisse’s epistemic justification. C 2 Talisse’s own conception of democracy is inconsistent with “fundamental value practice.” (ibid., 146)