Originally published by Springer International Publisher in “Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following” (ed. M. Araszkiewicz and others), 2015 ON THE KANTIAN ANSWER TO “KRIPKENSTEIN”’S RULE-FOLLOWING PARADOX Przemysław Tacik przemyslaw.tacik@gmail.com Jagiellonian University of Cracow Abstract This chapter aims to put Saul Kripke’s formulation of Wittgensteinian rule-following paradox in the context of Kant’s critical philosophy. I attempt to argue that a thorough re-examination of the Kantian critique can contribute to our better understanding of this paradox, because Kant himself strove to overcome a parallel form of scepticism – Hume’s. Moreover, I seek to demonstrate that Kantian views on normativity may contribute to avoiding the consequences of “Kripkenstein”’s radicalism without a simultaneous refutation of its main premises. Taking the interlinking between Hume’s and Kripkenstein’s thinking for a starting point, I attempt to reformulate Kantian arguments against Humean scepticism so that they could be applied to Kripkenstein’s paradox. These reflections are organised around two main ideas of Kant’s Critique: (1) arguments against the assumption of discontinuity of time; (2) the existence of two formal instances guaranteeing the coherence of experience: namely the “thing-in-itself” and the transcendental unity of apperception (TUA). Reassessment of the Kantian concept of the TUA gives an opportunity to propose a new perspective on normativity, whose core mechanism would lie in our readiness to correct ourselves. Finally, I juxtapose “Kripkenstein” and “Kantstein” – the latter being Kripke’s imaginary opponent, who accepts some premises of the rule-following paradox, yet puts them in a broader context which explains our effective usage of rules. Keywords: Wittgenstein, Kripke, Kant, rule-following paradox, normativity 1 I NTRODUCTION The famous book by Saul Kripke (1982) reassured Wittgenstein’s position as one of the leading sceptics in 20 th century philosophy. “Kripkenstein”’s paradox poses a challenge to our previous understanding of rule-following and normativity in general, as much as Hume’s scepticism posed a threat to pre-Kantian metaphysics. This comparison between both philosophers should be taken for accidental: not only both of them dealt a blow to their