Kaczmarski Domestic Sources of Russia’s China Policy 3 Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 59, no. 2, March/April 2012, pp. 3–17. © 2012 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075–8216 / 2012 $9.50 + 0.00. DOI 10.2753/PPC1075-8216590201 Despite a growing imbalance of power, Russia continues to strengthen its engagement with China because key actors in Russian domestic politics see the bilateral relationship as an opportunity rather than a threat. Domestic Sources of Russia’s China Policy Marcin Kaczmarski MARCIN KACZMARSKI is an expert at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Warsaw, and assistant professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw. R USSIA’S policy toward China has been explained mainly in terms of how Moscow responds to international constraints and opportunities. Geopolitical considerations, overarching pragmatism, great-power politics, and iden- tity have been identified as the primary movers of policy toward Beijing (Kuchins 2010, p. 33; Rozman 2010, pp. 28–29). Engagement with China has been interpreted as an element of Russia’s attempts to counterbalance Western dominance and to retain a supposed alternative (Kuchins 2010, pp. 35, 38; Lo 2008, pp. 43–44). Thus, structural factors are given a primary role in shaping Russia’s policy to the neglect of domestic politics (Bellacqua 2010a; Lo 2008; Rozman 2010). This approach fits in with the general reading of Russia’s foreign policy under Putin, which is interpreted as autonomous and as close to the rational actor model (Sakwa 2011). A complementary approach locates the sources of Russia’s policy toward China in Moscow’s limited options (Nojonen 2011). Close relations with Beijing are interpreted as Russia’s only possible way to protect itself “against a resurgent and potentially aggressive China” (Lo 2008, p. 44). Internal weakness—in particular, failure to develop the Russian Far East—is also responsible for Moscow’s yielding to Chinese demands and turning to Beijing (Blank 2001c, p. 4). 1 The official Kremlin position unanimously presents Beijing as a major strategic partner, rejecting the notion of China as a threat (Lo 2008, p. 69). 2 To quote Vladimir Putin at a meeting in Valdai: “Foreign experts keep tell- ing us about the threat from China. We are not worried at all. . . . We should be afraid. We are not afraid” (JRL 2010). We should not take Putin’s remarks at face value, but we should not simply ignore them either—especially