Property-Awareness and Representation Ivan V. Ivanov Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014 Abstract Is property-awareness constituted by represen- tation or not? If it were, merely being aware of the qualities of physical objects would involve being in a representa- tional state. This would have considerable implications for a prominent view of the nature of successful perceptual experiences. According to naı ¨ve realism, any such experi- ence—or more specifically its character—is fundamentally a relation of awareness to concrete items in the environ- ment. Naı ¨ve realists take their view to be a genuine alter- native to representationalism, the view on which the character of such experiences is constituted by represen- tation. But naı ¨ve realists must admit qualities or property instances as items of awareness if they are to remain wedded to common sense, and the nature of property- awareness may smuggle constitutive representation into the naı ¨ve realist account of character. I argue that whether property-awareness involves representation, and conse- quently whether naı ¨ve realism is distinct from representa- tionalism or not, depends on what qualities are fundamentally. On universalist and nominalist accounts, property-awareness turns out to involve representation. Not so under tropism. Keywords Naı ¨ve realism Á Representationalism Á Property-awareness Á Properties Á Universals Á Tropes Á Nominalism Á The argument from appearing Does property-awareness involve representation? More pre- cisely, is conscious awareness of the qualities of objects in one’s environment constituted by being in a state that presents some non-trivial condition as being the case? The answer bears on the significance of a prominent view of the nature of experience known as naı ¨ve realism. According to naı ¨ve realists, 1 successful perceptual experiences are relational states or events constituted by the subject and the objects perceived on a given occasion. The relation which obtains is taken to be one of primitive awareness. Naı ¨ve realism is considered by its proponents to be a genuine alternative to representationalism, a view on which perceptual experiences are fundamentally states that represent the environment as being a certain way. And indeed, on the face of it, there is nothing in the naı ¨ve realist account of experience that may entail constitutive representation. However, as I will estab- lish, naı ¨ve realists must admit qualities or property-instances among the relata of awareness that constitute experiential character, and the nature of property-awareness may smuggle representation into the account. So the key issue bearing on the distinctiveness of naı ¨ve realism is whether property-awareness is constituted by representation. Some have claimed that, upon reflection, it clearly is; others have insisted that it is not. 2 I will argue that the answer is not clear-cut and depends on what ontology of qualities one adopts. On universalism and nominalism, being aware of the qualities of objects turns out to involve representation—but not so on tropism. The I. V. Ivanov (&) Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Social Science Building, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK e-mail: i.ivanov@warwick.ac.uk 1 See Martin (2002), Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), Johnston (2004, 2007), and Brewer (2006). 2 Compare McDowell’s claim in (1998) that, once we admit inhering properties as part of visual consciousness, it follows that ‘‘visual intuitions of objects simply are seeings that… looked as if from a different angle’’ (ibid., 462) with Johnston’s insistence in (2006) that once we distinguish predication from instantiation, we can help ourselves to property-awareness free of representation, since ‘‘the ‘logical togetherness’ of the property of being a cube and the cube is not the same in the sensed exemplification and the judgement’’ (ibid., ff 16). 123 Topoi DOI 10.1007/s11245-014-9274-3