The role of mental states in argumentation: Two problems for rationality from the psychology of belief DAVID GODDEN Department of Philosophy Old Dominion University Norfolk, Virginia U.S.A. 23529 Email: dgodden@odu.edu www.davidgodden.ca Godden, D. (2012). The role of mental states in argumentation: Two problems for rationality from the psychology of belief. In F. Paglieri, L. Tummolini, R. Falcone, and M. Miceli (Eds.), The goals of cognition: Essays in honor of Cristiano Castelfranchi (pp. 123-143). London: College Publications. ABSTRACT: This chapter recognizes the contributions made to the theory of ar- gument by the work of Cristiano Castelfranchi, together with Fabio Paglieri, by situating their work in the development of social, or process-based accounts of ar- gumentation. It is argued that this orientation to the social requires grounding in the psychological, and thus calls for a belief-based perspective on argumentation. It is shown how Castelfranchi’s work on the ontology of belief in relation to goals and intentions, together with the Data-oriented Belief Revision model contributes to this approach by bridging the gap between the social and the psychological. The paper concludes by raising two problems for standard models of argument arising from the psychology of belief: (i) that we seem to lack adequate voluntary control over our beliefs to be rationally responsible for them, and (ii) that we seem not to be reason trackers in the way required by standard accounts of rationality em- ployed in argumentation. KEYWORDS: argumentation; belief perseverance; belief revision; Castelfranchi, Cristiano; cognition; Data-oriented belief revision; deontological theory of ration- ality; psychology of belief; rationality; voluntarism argument