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Abstract Much literature on group brainstorming has found it to be less effective than individ- ual brainstorming. However, a cognitive perspective suggests that group brainstorming could be an effective technique for gen- erating creative ideas. Computer simulations of an associative memory model of idea genera- tion in groups suggest that groups have the potential to generate ideas that individuals brainstorming alone are less likely to generate. Exchanging ideas by means of writing or computers, alternating solitary and group brainstorming, and using heterogeneous groups ap- pear to be useful approaches for enhancing group brain- storming. Keywords brainstorming; cognitive stimu- lation; groups; group creativity There is a general belief in the efficacy of collaboration for projects involving innovation or problem solving (Bennis & Bieder- man, 1997; Sutton & Hargadon, 1996). Although there is some evi- dence for the effectiveness of col- laborative science and teamwork (Paulus, 2000), the enthusiasm for collective work may not always be justified. Controlled studies of idea sharing in groups have shown that groups often overestimate their ef- fectiveness (Paulus, Larey, & Ortega, 1995). Experiments comparing in- teractive brainstorming groups with sets of individuals who do not interact in performing the same task have found that groups gener- ate fewer ideas and that group members exhibit reduced motiva- tion and do not fully share unique information (e.g., Mullen, Johnson, & Salas, 1991). The strongest inhib- itory effect of groups may be pro- duction blocking, which is a reduc- tion in productivity due to the fact that group members must take turns in describing their ideas (Diehl & Stroebe, 1991). One area in which these prob- lems are most evident is the study of group creativity. Most research on creativity has examined indi- vidual creativity because it is typi- cally seen as a personal trait or skill. However, today much creative work requires collaboration of peo- ple with diverse sets of knowledge and skills. How can such groups overcome the inevitable liabilities of group interaction to reach their creative potential? Is it possible to demonstrate that group interaction can lead to enhanced creativity? Examining these questions has been the aim of our program of re-